China’s ‘Liaoning’ aircraft carrier attracted a lot of attention on Wednesday last week, when it sailed to its home port via the Taiwan Strait. It is expected that in the next 10 years, China will launch two new aircraft carriers into service, and equipped with new carrier-based aircraft, they will have full combat capabilities; therefore Chinese battle group activities in the Taiwan Strait will become routine. With its limited resources, Taiwan’s defense strategy needs a complete overhaul to be able to respond.
Let us first address the Liaoning. Although it was on a training mission, the main purpose at that stage was to establish and correct various parameters, establish operating guidelines and technical orders, and to provide observation and calibration services for China’s marine surveillance satellites and its over-the-horizon Tianbo (天波) radar. These are intended to provide the basis for follow-up development and preparation of the naval force.
At the same time, factors like the flight deck coating for withstanding high-temperature jet exhaust, decks, hangar ground handling equipment, night takeoff and landing devices and so on all require many voyages to be able to quickly verify, research and improve, and all these are the main training subjects of the Liaoning battle group. In spite of the training purpose, each voyage the Liaoning makes stirs East Asia, which has already made the aircraft carrier politically and strategically significant.
Next, the main point: Taiwan Strait defense. Air power is the key to Taiwan’s defense, but it needs to consider the resources invested, the development of modern military technology and that air power consists of both “command of the air” and “air defense.” The traditional concept of air power is mainly based on using the air force to defend and control the airspace.
However, given its limited resources, Taiwan does not have sufficient resources to support a US-style air power; the European model of air power is more suitable for Taiwan. NATO’s air power strategy using mobile air defenses as its backbone also provides a useful reference.
This is mainly because, first, the diversity of air power elements, offensive uncrewed aerial vehicles and new air defense systems have provided Taiwan with more options. Second, a medium-range air defense system, which has also been adapted by US forces, can effectively suppress air-to-surface precision-guided munitions with a range of about 50km due to the Earth’s curvature and cost. Using long-range cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk system, to attack motor vehicles is uneconomical. Third, advanced air defense missiles have multiple interception capabilities and they have been regarded as a cost-effective strategic deterrent.
For example, the US’ deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in South Korea and Russia’s deployment of the S-400 Triumf missile system in Syria have had a real strategic effect and they are no longer mere defense systems for campaign and tactical levels.
For example, Germany’s decision to adopt the advanced Medium Extended Air Defense System for its missile defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach are based on the considerations that building a new generation of fighters is costly and that advanced air defense systems are more effective as a defensive strategy.
In addition, Taiwan should change the traditional concept of air-force-to-air-force, navy-to-navy or army-to-army engagement. It could apply the “horse racing strategy” and use “slow horses” to compete against “fast horses,” that is, using cheaper mobile air-defense missiles to wear down the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force to allow Taiwan’s navy and air force to increase their combat power.
Meanwhile, from the perspective of military equipment investment cost-effectiveness, investing NT$30 billion (US$950 million) would allow Taiwan to build a Perry-class frigate or 18 F-16 Fighting Falcon warplanes, but the same money can be used to purchase 90 sets of medium-range anti-aircraft missile vehicles and 600 missiles — based on the surface-to-air TC2 Sky Sword II missile system — with high operational flexibility. Perhaps it would be possible to create better strategic value using an even better combination and adopt an asymmetric strategy that would give greater return at lower cost and make it possible to defeat a more powerful enemy.
Considering Taiwan’s defense resources, military science and technological development, as well as the air power strategy of European nations, thinking of Taiwan as an “unsinkable carrier” is a more viable model for the nation’s defense. As a strategic force, land-based medium-range mobile air defense units will provide the most cost-effective investment in Taiwan’s defense; they can quickly be raised, and can substantially offset China’s air superiority.
The regional security structures in East Asia or the first island chain will be reshuffled within the next 10 years due to the transformation of international security, China’s new projection capabilities, and leadership changes in the US and China. Taiwan’s resources are relatively limited. Therefore, it is necessary to apply new concepts to reform the national defense forces.
This would enable Taiwan to play a key role in regional affairs, ensure its own rights and interests, and maintain its voice in international affairs.
Su Tzu-yun is chief executive officer of Center for Advanced Technology at Tamkang University.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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