While the world is still contemplating the ramifications of Donald Trump’s presidency, a major constitutional crisis that is unfolding in Hong Kong deserves much attention.
After barring two directly elected lawmakers — Yau Wai-ching (游蕙禎) and Sixtus “Baggio” Leung (梁頌恆) — from taking their seats in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, China threatened to expel another eight pro-democracy lawmakers who did not pledge their allegiance to the communist regime.
This is not a moment of calm, but a moment of great anxiety for Hong Kongers, who are witnessing the rapid deterioration of the territory from a highly autonomous region into a colony without the ability to shape its own destiny.
The expulsion fiasco signaled that China abandoned its gradualist approach in favor of an assertive policy that could bring Hong Kong in line with the rest of the nation. By disqualifying the elected representatives and suspending portions of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, China decided to implement the Maoist strategy of revolutionary struggle to purge dissent from the Legislative Council.
The latest Chinese interference is reminiscent of an episode in 1995 when Beijing rejected the Council election results under the last British governor, Christopher Pattern, as too democratic. China then replaced the legitimately elected council with a provisional one whose 60 members were handpicked by Beijing before the handover of the territory’s sovereignty on July 1, 1997.
In recent years, China’s rising military and economic might gave its leaders renewed confidence and determination. The hardliners in charge of Hong Kong affairs justified the political intervention as a pre-emptive measure needed to defend the socialist motherland against local separatism and foreign intrusions.
This ideological shift coincided with the consolidation of Beijing’s control over the Hong Kong Police Force, a semi-militarized armed force created by the British.
More than capable of undertaking civilian policing tasks in peacetime, the police could be mobilized by the Hong Kong chief executive as a defense against protestors as happened at the end of the “Umbrella movement” in December 2014 and during the “fishball revolution” in February.
Abandoning the culture of neutrality in politics, the police has served as a powerful instrument of oppression. The Hong Kong government spent tens of millions on militarizing the police and improving its welfare. Most police commanders and frontline officers are more willing than before to defend Beijing’s agenda and keep the frustrated public at bay.
The central tenets of Hong Kong’s civil society — free press and the rule of law — are under severe attack. Even though China does not prohibit the exercise of civic liberty and the gathering of anti-communist rallies, it has exploited many crises to tighten control and propagate a nationalistic narrative at all levels of Hong Kong society.
Politically, China has succeeded in undermining the mobilizing capabilities of many local pro-Beijing and pro-democracy parties. It kept Hong Kong communist groups fragmented and prevented them from forming a united political organization. The purpose was to avoid negotiating with a homegrown political force that could switch its adherence and embrace democratic localism.
This happened in the spring of 1989 when most local communist labor unions, student groups and neighborhood associations allied with other community activists to support the pro-democracy student movement in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. With this lesson in mind, Beijing deployed the tactic of divide and rule to co-opt various interest groups, playing one faction against another one to maintain its rule.
On the economic front, the Chinese official propaganda boasted its strong support of the territory. Although the huge growth of Chinese tourists, investors and migrants benefited Hong Kong’s banking and real-estate sectors, the outsiders overwhelmed the territory’s infrastructure and caused a great deal of inconveniences to the public.
Rather than advancing mutual understanding, the increased interactions between Chinese and Hong Kongers led to serious clashes of values and lifestyles, escalating tensions on both sides.
Dismissing these sociocultural problems, many business tycoons urged the government to admit more Chinese tourists and investors to enrich themselves while ordinary people were squeezed out in the competitive economy.
Worse still, Hong Kong’s chief executives have failed to deliver effective governance. They lacked a sense of sophistication in managing political and economic affairs, and have been incapable of making the territory globally competitive.
Instead of defending commoners against exploitation by rich and powerful people, they favored big businesses, reduced public welfare expenditures, imposed Beijing’s autocratic agendas and put a brake on democratization.
Hong Kong’s millennials who were born after 1997 will finish their college education and become professionals in the early 2020s. They are now seeing the dismantling of the constitutional framework of the “one country, two systems” model.
Distrust, tension and hostility are detrimental to a collaborative relationship between Hong Kong and China. Any top-down intervention into Hong Kong’s affairs is counterproductive, antagonizing millennials to the point of open resistance against any infringement of their democratic rights.
The solution clearly lies with China. It might be wise for Beijing to adopt peaceful conflict resolution as a strategic priority and acknowledge Hong Kongers’ resentment against an authoritarian order. Only by doing so can Beijing restore the public’s confidence on the integrity of “one country, two systems.”
Joseph Tse-hei Lee is professor of history at Pace University in New York City.
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