The administration of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has implemented some important progressive measures. For example, in her apology to Taiwanese Aborigines on Monday, Tsai promised to deal with the nuclear waste on Orchid Island (Lanyu, 蘭嶼) and to recognize Pingpu peoples, including the Siraya, who have long requested official acknowledgement of their existence.
Yet, the new government has also made some very bad mistakes. Here, I will comment on two, one in foreign relations and one in domestic matters.
The response of the Presidential Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to the award of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, the Netherlands, about the South China Sea only mentioned “Taiwan” once when the ministry quite correctly complained that the award used the term “Taiwan Authority of China.” However, the other 25 and more references in both documents were to the “Republic of China” or the ROC, not to Taiwan. What happened to the president who signed her name in Panama as “President of Taiwan?”
Even though mention of the “nine-dash line” was omitted, the government’s claim remained the same.
In the words of the Presidential Office statement: “The government of the Republic of China stresses that the ROC is entitled to all rights over the South China Sea Islands and their relevant waters in accordance with international law and the law of the sea.”
To those of us who have studied the history of the South China Sea, this claim has always lacked any basis. Eliminating mention of the “nine-dash” line did not make Taiwan’s case any stronger.
One result has been that the Taiwanese government has been closely associated with the Chinese claim, as both have used the same historical “facts.”
In its analysis of responses to the international court’s ruling, Washington think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies — where Tsai spoke during her presidential campaign — divided the responses of nations to the award into several categories, which can be seen here: amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/.
Only five nations opposed the ruling: China, Montenegro, Pakistan, Sudan and Taiwan. None of the other four has expressed any friendship for Taiwan and all are well-known dictatorships. What is Taiwan doing in this company?
In addition, the government has consistently neglected to mention the one historical fact that could help Taiwan’s claim to Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島) — that the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan administered Itu Aba as part of Kaohsiung. Taiwan today can claim it as the successor government to the Japanese colonial government of Taiwan and thereby has rights to Itu Aba.
How should Taiwan have responded to the tribunal?
First, it should have realized that the award’s declaring that no “islands” exist in the South China Sea did not affect Taiwan’s claim for Itu Aba since Taiwan has not tried to enforce a 200 nautical mile (370.4km) exclusive economic zone.
Second, the government should have realized that the award actually strengthens Taiwan’s hand by stating that the waters of the South China Sea belong to all nations. The rejection of China’s claims over the area actually helps Taiwan’s strategic situation.
The government should have said something like: “As a law-abiding and peace-loving nation, we welcome the award of the Hague Arbitral Tribunal and we look forward to cooperating with other nations of the region and the world in promoting freedom of navigation through these important waters.”
In one sentence, Taipei could have put Taiwan on the “correct side” of both history and international relations. Instead, the government stupidly repeated the nonsense that we have heard from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) for more than six decades.
Domestically, the government has made a major mistake in its nomination of Public Functionary Disciplinary Sanction Commission Chief Commissioner Hsieh Wen-ting (謝文定) as Judicial Yuan president. Tsai’s administration has repeatedly stressed the importance of judicial reform, yet it has taken a prosecutor from the old dictatorship.
I met Hsieh in 1980, as he was the prosecutor who charged me. According to an article published in the Chinese-language Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister paper) on Saturday last week, Hsieh stated: “Bruce Jacobs could not possibly be the murderer.” (The Taipei Times also ran the story: “Interview: Judicial Yuan nominee defends his record,” Aug. 2, page 3). If that is the case, why did he issue a criminal subpoena in which I was listed as “the defendant” in the “murder” case? Why did he forbid me to leave Taiwan when I needed to teach at my university and take care of my young daughter?
Furthermore, the extra three months in Taiwan cost me about US$6,500 to US$7,500 in expenses for a lawyer, international phone calls and laundry. Today, that would be considerably more and, with interest, the compensation would probably exceed US$100,000 since I was held in Taiwan against my will even though I was not guilty.
How can a prosecutor impose a lot of pain and financial strain on a person he says was innocent?
And, if I was not guilty, why was so much of Taiwanese taxpayers’ money wasted? One newspaper report said the amount the Criminal Investigation Bureau spent on me exceeded NT$300,000. In 1980, that was a huge amount of money.
Instead of picking someone from the old dictatorial regime, why not nominate someone who criticized the old dictatorial judicial system and who is committed to reforming the judiciary?
The appointment processes of the new government require an immediate renovation and transformation in both foreign relations and domestically. Otherwise, it will be difficult to distinguish the new government from the previous KMT governments and the new government will repeatedly fail.
Bruce Jacobs is emeritus professor of Asian languages and studies at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.
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