In his opening remarks at this year’s session of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) said that Beijing would never allow an independent Taiwan, demanding the incoming Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) administration adhere to the so-called “1992 consensus” and “one China, different interpretations” framework. Combined with last month’s re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Gambia, a former ally of Taiwan, China is evidently tightening the screws on Taipei.
Given the stark power disparity with Taiwan and China, the former has to walk a tightrope. It must neither unnecessarily provoke Beijing, nor must it place itself at the mercy of China’s tricks. Thus, Taiwan has to develop a tit-for-tat approach aimed at deterring Beijing from initiating diplomatic offensives or halt them.
Taiwan can take advantage of the “1992 consensus.” It must neither abolish the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution nor amend major clauses in a way that negates the “one China” principle, or give up its de jure territories in China, which would require a legislative motion followed by a referendum. A declaration of independence as well as a referendum are beyond Beijing’s red lines, because they are two sides of the same coin. On the other hand, other measures would be permissible as long as they are limited to symbolic acts without changing the “status quo.”
The ROC has existed since 1912, while the PRC was established in 1949. Hence, the ROC retains legal and historical prominency, including de jure jurisdiction in parts of China. Beijing cannot deny this, neither willingly nor reluctantly, as it is the basis of Taiwan’s adherence to the “1992 consensus.”
Should China try to establish diplomatic relations with other allies of Taiwan, the incoming Democratic Progressive Party government could announce its intent to officially designate Taipei as the nation’s capital. The official seat of the ROC government is still Nanjing, while Taipei has been its temporary capital since 1949. Doing this would not contravene the “1992 consensus,” given that the ROC Constitution does not stipulate the nation’s capital. In doing so, Taiwan can show that it remains defiant against Beijing’s diplomatic maneuvers.
Should China make further diplomatic attacks, Taiwan must target Beijing’s Achilles’ heel: weak national integration involving latent instability in Tibet and Xinjiang. Taiwan first has to make active use of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, a ministry-level organization of the executive branch. It embodies Taiwan’s de jure jurisdiction over Tibet, but no longer over Outer Mongolia, which has gained independence as the Republic of Mongolia, without being able to exercise any effective control there. It is a legacy of the past ROC polity.
The commission can publish annual reports on the state of human rights in China, with a focus on Tibet. The reports, if published in several languages, would be an effective tool for Taiwan’s international public relations operation against China. Doing so does not constitute an intervention of the PRC’s internal affairs, given that Taipei has de jure jurisdiction in the territories.
Should China not halt its diplomatic assaults, Taiwan can intensify its counterattack by providing more scathing criticism of Beijing’s violations and abuses of human rights in Tibet. Given its de jure jurisdiction in China, it could even designate another government agency to publish similar human rights reports about other areas, including Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.
As an additional countermeasure, Taiwan can contact the Tibetan government-in-exile in India more often and openly extend moral support, because it demands genuine autonomy, not independence. It can also contact individual Uighur human rights activists, not the East Turkistan government-in-exile that demands independence.
Taipei could play an international legitimacy game with Beijing. Taiwan would be forced to remain defensive or, at best, conduct damage limitation in the recognition issue involving a reduction of its international space.
However, Taiwan actually has the upper hand regarding the issues of human rights and democracy in being able to diminish Beijing’s reputation.
Taiwan has to be prepared for China’s second round of diplomatic offensives. Its countermeasures must be reactive, not pre-emptive, and fine-tuned in light of sequential implementation and gradual escalation in intensity.
Taiwan might be able to deter China with such a solid menu of countermeasures. It is high time that Taiwan overcomes the underdog mentality.
Masahiro Matsumura is a professor of international politics at Saint Andrew’s University in Osaka, Japan, and ROC-MOFA Taiwan Fellow at the center for security studies at National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations.
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