Volkswagen’s rigging of emissions tests for diesel cars comes after nearly 20 years of the technology being incentivized in Europe in the knowledge that its adoption would reduce global warming emissions, but led to thousands of extra deaths from increased levels of toxic gases.
Diesel was a niche market in Europe until the mid-1990s, making up less than 10 percent of the car fleet. Diesels produce 15 percent less carbon dioxide than gasoline, but emit four times more nitrogen dioxide pollution and 22 times more particulates — the tiny particles that penetrate the lungs, brain and heart.
Following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol climate change agreement in 1997, most rich countries were legally obliged to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by an average of 8 percent over 15 years.
Illustration: Lance Liu
Japanese and US car makers backed research into hybrid and electric cars, but the European Commission was lobbied strongly by big German car makers BMW, Volkswagen and Daimler, to incentivize diesel. A switch to diesel was said by the industry to be a cheap and fast way to reduce the carbon emissions that drive climate change.
The subsequent European Commission’s 1998 European Automobile Manufacturers Association agreement with all European car makers was backed by then-EU transport commissioner Neil Kinnock and UK environment secretary John Prescott. It committed passenger car-makers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 25 percent over 10 years.
“It was practically an order to switch to diesel. The European car fleet was transformed from being almost entirely petrol to predominantly diesel. Britain, along with Germany, France and Italy, offered subsidies and sweeteners to persuade car makers and the public to buy diesel,” said Simon Birkett, director of the Clean Air London group.
The European auto industry ramped up diesel engine production. Under EU pressure, governments kept the diesel price below that of gasoline. In the UK, the amount motorists paid in vehicle excise duty was linked to cars’ carbon dioxide emissions, effectively incentivizing people to buy diesels.
“Diesel cars should attract less vehicle tax than their petrol equivalents because of their better carbon dioxide performance,” then-UK chancellor of the exchequer Gordon Brown said in 1998.
The results were dramatic, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders in the UK said. From being a quirky choice, diesel went mainstream in Europe. Its market share in the UK rose from under 10 percent in 1995 to more than 50 percent in 2012. Britain now has 11.8 million diesel cars in use, making up one of the greatest diesel car fleets in the world.
However, the trade-off between reducing climate emissions and increasing health problems was not widely debated, civil servants and politicians said. In addition, carmakers found it easy to cheat the system, they said.
“Diesel was seen as a good thing because it produces less carbon dioxide, so we gave people incentives to buy diesel cars,” said Martin Williams, professor of air quality research at King’s College London since 2010, and former head of the UK government’s air quality science unit.
“The [emission] tests were simply not stringent enough. They were devised by a UN committee based in Geneva called the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations, which was dominated by people from the car industry,” he said.
“What’s more, it was easy for some manufacturers to calibrate cars’ computers to spot when the car was being tested and reduce emissions until the test was over,” he told the Sunday Times in July.
David Fisk, chief scientist and policy director in the UK Department of Environment and Transport in the 1990s, told the Guardian that there had been “concern” in government when it was proposed that diesel be backed over gasoline.
“The motor manufacturers made a demarche [a political initiative] to the Department of the Environment, showing that a major switch to diesels would lead to a substantial drop in carbon emissions,” Fisk said.
He added that the air quality division in the UK’s then-Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions saw there was a problem — that local air pollution would increase as a result — so a national system of air quality standards was created.
Former Greenpeace UK chief Stephen Tindale, who was working on air pollution in the Department of the Environment at the time, remembers a battle between environment and air pollution divisions.
“Air quality was just not on the political agenda in the late 1990s. In 1997, Labour’s policy was for a 20 percent cut in carbon emissions by 2020. [Former British prime minister] Tony Blair wasn’t obsessed with climate, but he saw the political and sound bite advantage. The Department of Health was dozy, with Frank Dobson and then David Blunkett in charge,” Tindale said.
A senior civil servant, now retired, who worked in the Department for Transport, but asked not to be named, said that cost-benefit studies of a switch to diesel were done by government but climate change was “the new kid on the block” and long-term projections of comparative technologies were not perfect.
“We did not sleepwalk into this. To be totally reductionist, you are talking about killing people today rather than saving lives tomorrow. Occasionally, we had to say we were living in a different political world and everyone had to swallow hard,” he said.
However, Michael Meacher, UK environment minister from 1997 to 2003, said he could not recall ever being consulted on the UK’s switch to diesel.
“If it had been a question of a trade-off between carbon emissions and health, much as I would have wanted to reduce climate emissions, the medical effects would have trumped it. I would have been keen to see a major reduction in [carbon] emissions, but I would not have wanted that to be at the price of lives,” he said.
As new research shows that diesel fumes are worse than expected for health, triggering cancers, heart attacks and the stunting of children’s growth, many politicians have admitted a major environmental mistake.
UK shadow environment minister Barry Gardiner told C4 last year that that it was the “wrong decision” to incentivize diesel.
“Hands up — there’s absolutely no question that the decision we took was the wrong decision. But at that time we didn’t have the evidence that subsequently we did have,” he said.
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