Before Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) reported to Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), the KMT would not announce its candidate for next year’s Republic of China (ROC) presidential election. Was this why Chu had to meet with Xi?
Chu, who serves concurrently as the mayor of New Taipei City, visited China in his capacity as KMT chairman. The party’s politicians often like to mention the so-called “1992 consensus,” but a KMT chairman serving concurrently as president would not be able to visit China. As for the party’s stance that there is “one China, with each side making its own interpretation,” Taiwanese can only ask what that interpretation really means. The KMT itself does not seem to know.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is exactly what it is. What about the ROC? Exactly what is it? When Chu met with Xi, the KMT chairman did not dare go any further than mentioning that Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) launched a revolution against the Qing Dynasty and established the ROC. Did he dare mention the ROC to Xi’s face after it went into exile in Taiwan in 1949 following a second revolution? Of course not. KMT politicians only dare to talk about the ROC at home. They are a bunch of disgraceful political clowns constantly embarrassing themselves.
If Xi hopes that Chu will run for president, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) might try to create favorable conditions for him. They might even sacrifice President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). It could order a Taiwanese businessperson — perhaps a heavyweight capitalist — to provide evidence of wrongdoing to destroy Ma’s clean image. Perhaps that would help draw a line between the KMT and Ma, and create a new image for the party to allow it to continue to deceive Taiwanese.
Taiwanese can only wonder whether the CCP sees the KMT as its tamed political representative in Taiwan. The KMT government fled to Taiwan, where it has behaved whichever way it wanted under the ROC banner. The party has transformed itself from being anticommunist to moving closer to the CCP, working together with it and attaching itself to it and it will eventually surrender to it. On the surface, the KMT praises the two Chiangs — Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son former president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) — at every turn, but it discarded them somewhere in a dark corner long ago. As the era of Ma edges closer to collapse, the party is now under the leadership of Chu, a mere local government head.
Look at the people who visit China for political or business reasons: They will say anything that serves their interests. It seems that the KMT has lost its party spirit, and feels more comfortable in China than in Taiwan.
If the PRC is so unhappy that the ROC remains in exile in Taiwan, it is welcome to take the ROC back and perhaps establish a historical and cultural park to shelter it, and let Taiwan be Taiwan instead of the ROC. That would be the perfect solution. Why should China bother manipulating Taiwan’s presidential election?
Taiwanese have awakened and do not favor the KMT. Flying the ROC banner, this vicious political force is trying hard to become the CCP’s representative. The “1992 consensus” does not really exist, and it really only means “one China” without any room for any interpretations of what that “one China” might be. Taiwanese have long since understood that the KMT continues to follow closely in the CCP’s footsteps, not daring to deviate from the path.
As for those with loftier aspirations, they should show the KMT and the CCP how it is done in next year’s presidential election.
Lee Min-yung is a poet.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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