The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) last week withdrew its lawsuit against Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) over his party membership and announced the formal alliance of Wang with KMT Chairman and New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫). President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) — who recently resigned as chairman of the KMT — issued a personal statement expressing his “deep regret and strong disapproval,” while labeling it a hypocritical decision that blurred the line between right and wrong. Since the Taipei District Court and High Court have both ruled in Wang’s favor, in the eyes of Ma this is tantamount to being snubbed, leaving the president back where he started.
The political fighting between Ma and Wang that erupted in September 2013 seems to have emerged because of the president’s power being stronger than that of the legislature. In fact, behind the scenes, Ma blamed Wang for the government’s inability to speedily ratify the service trade pact, even feeling that Wang was responsible for the collapse of the planned meeting between Ma and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
Who would have thought this storm in a teacup would unintentionally spark the Sunflower movement and cause the already widespread discontent to snowball into a situation that left Ma’s administration tottering on the brink of collapse?
It triggered the premature firing of the starting gun for the race to find Ma’s successor and tarnished the reputations of Vice President Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) and former premier Jiang Yi-huah (江宜樺), with the latter facing difficulty returning to his previous post as a university professor having resigned after the party’s defeat in last year’s nine-in-one elections. The KMT also ceded control of the Taipei City Government after an unbroken 16-year run.
If Ma had not adopted the position of eventual unification, and had just stuck to leading a relatively ineffectual government, the public would have eventually forgiven him for his boastful “6-3-3” pledge and the various promises made during his 2008 presidential election campaign. At the very least, Ma would have left behind the image of those ultra-skimpy jogging shorts that he is so fond of wearing.
Persistently lacking in leadership skills, yet hating to be neglected, it is unclear why from the very outset Ma expended all his energy in attacking long-serving KMT local party members and insisted on slandering them with accusations of corruption. It seemed that nothing short of their removal from office would satisfy Ma. By way of example, former minister of the interior and party secretary-general Liao Liou-yi (廖了以) was literally dragged into central government so that Ma could keep a close eye on him. Worked like a dog, Liao eventually decided to tender his resignation and return to Taichung.
The commander, it seems, was unable to trust his generals, no matter how many one-on-one meetings took place. It is as if Ma, looking over his shoulder, constantly sees the image of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) staring back at him.
Wang certainly meets the criteria to be a KMT politician: He has plenty of energy and is easily influenced. Wang’s considerable popularity, his inability to refuse others and his willingness to work with both the pan-green and pan-blue camps will certainly arouse the envy of others.
During former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) minority government, Wang facilitated the ratification of the Chen administration’s budgets. Following the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) return to opposition, there have been persistent rumors of Wang collaborating with DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), which of course aroused the suspicions of the insecure president.
Once Ma’s political scouts got a sniff of Wang interacting with DPP caucus whip Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘), Ma was itching to get involved and started a bloody political battle. However, Ma paid a double penalty for his clumsy tactics and was left with no choice but to withdraw to the womb of the New Party.
Eric Chu was initially seen by all as the party’s heir apparent, but since the KMT suffered a major setback at the nine-in-one elections, Chu’s power has declined, too. Since Ma still wields the levers of power from behind the scenes, Chu will have his work cut out attempting to hold together a party whose appetite for government has already begun to wane.
As a natural conservative, for Chu to have recently advocated constitutional reform to a Cabinet-style system of government — and in doing so skirted around the main issue — he demonstrated that he is out of step with his party. Hence, the political rehabilitation of Wang was needed to dispel the misgivings of party members. Chu’s next task will be to address the question of how to reduce Ma’s influence to a minimum. If Chu persists with his planned retirement, the conservative wing of the KMT would probably be unable to accept Wang as its presidential candidate, leading to another rift within the party.
Since the balance of power between factions within the KMT is inherently restricted, the party is unable to absorb independent local factions. With powerful backing in the media, the People First Party (PFP) is itching to get stuck in. PFP Chariman James Soong (宋楚瑜) looks rather like a reincarnation of former president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國). It is a shame that as the presidential elections draw near, Ma seems less inclined to entrust Soong with an important position within his administration.
Yet, consider how Lee provided the catalyst for Taiwanese politics to take an alternative route through the forming of an alliance. Besides, political parties representing civic groups have recently entered the public realm. What if former DPP chairman Lin I-hsiung (林義雄) becomes dissatisfied with the political situation? The party system will then become even more fragmented.
If Chu appeals for total conformity within the KMT, this will only serve to paper over the cracks. It seems the only way ahead for the KMT, if it wants to remain united, is to become the “party of eventual unification.”
Shih Cheng-feng is a professor at National Dong Hwa University’s Department of Indigenous Affairs and Development.
Translated by Edward Jones
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