Some analysts believe that last year ushered in a new era of Cold War-style geopolitics. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea were met with heavy economic sanctions from Europe and the US, weakening Russia’s ties with the West and leaving the Kremlin eager to strengthen ties with China. The question is whether Russia will manage to build a real alliance with China.
At first glance, it seems plausible. Indeed, balance-of-power theory suggests that US primacy in power should be offset by a Sino-Russian partnership.
Perhaps more convincing, there seems to be historical precedent for such a partnership. In the 1950s, China and the then-Soviet Union were allied against the US. After then-US president Richard Nixon’s opening to China in 1972, the balance shifted, with the US and China cooperating to limit what they viewed as a dangerous rise in the Soviet Union’s power.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that de facto US-China alliance ended and a China-Russia rapprochement began. In 1992, the two nations declared that they were pursuing a “constructive partnership”; in 1996, they progressed toward a “strategic partnership”; and in 2001, they signed a treaty of “friendship and cooperation.”
In recent years, China and Russia have cooperated closely in the UN Security Council and taken similar positions on Internet regulation. They have used diplomatic frameworks — such as the BRICS group of major emerging nations (along with Brazil, India and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) — to coordinate positions. Also, Putin has struck up a good working relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), based on their shared domestic illiberalism and desire to counter US ideology and influence.
Their economic relationship, too, seems to be progressing. In May last year, shortly after the annexation of Crimea, Russia announced a US$400 billion deal to supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas to China annually for 30 years, beginning in 2019.
The contract, between Russia’s Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corp, entails the construction of a 4,000km gas pipeline to China’s Heilongjiang Province — where the two nations nearly went to war a few decades ago. Though the exact price remains secret, it appears that Russia offered major concessions — after nearly a decade of negotiations — to ensure the deal’s success.
Moreover, in November last year, Gazprom announced a framework pact to deliver an additional 30 billion cubic meters of gas to Xinjiang Province from Siberia for 30 years via another new pipeline.
If the “eastern” and “western” pipelines are completed, the 68 billion cubic meters they deliver to China annually would dwarf the 40 billion cubic meters that Russia exports to its current largest customer, Germany.
This might seem to portend an ever-deepening bilateral relationship. However, there is a hitch: The gas deals amplify a significant bilateral trade imbalance, with Russia supplying raw materials to China and importing Chinese manufactured goods, and the deals do not make up for Russia’s lost access to the Western technology that it needs to develop arctic fields and become an energy superpower, rather than just China’s gas station.
The problems with a Sino-Russian alliance run even deeper. With its economic, military and demographic heft, China generates considerable unease in Russia. Consider the demographic situation in eastern Siberia, where 6 million Russians live across the border from up to 120 million Chinese.
Furthermore, Russia’s economic and military power has been in decline, whereas China’s has exploded. Anxiety over China’s conventional military superiority probably motivated, at least partly, Russia’s 2009 announcement of a new military doctrine explicitly reserving the right to the first use of nuclear weapons — a stance that resembles the US’ Cold War force posture, aimed at deterring superior conventional Soviet forces in Europe.
These imbalances suggest that Russia would resist a tight military alliance with China, even as the two sides pursue mutually beneficial tactical diplomatic coordination.
China’s willingness to cooperate with Russia also has its limits. After all, China’s development strategy depends on its continued integration into the world economy — and, specifically, reliable access to US markets and technology. The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy depends on strong economic growth and it would not risk this strategy for some “authoritarian alliance” with Russia.
Even within multilateral forums, the relationship between Russia and China is far from balanced. Given that China’s economy is larger than the other four BRICS economies combined, the group’s initiatives — including its new development bank — are likely to reflect a disproportionate Chinese influence, and though the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has facilitated some diplomatic coordination, China and Russia remain locked in a struggle for influence in Central Asia.
The Sino-Russian alliance in the 20th century was a product of China’s weakness following World War II and at the beginning of the Cold War — and, even then, it lasted little more than a decade. Today’s China is strong and unlikely to get too close to a Russia whose decline has been accelerated by its leader’s poor judgement.
In short, when it comes to a Sino-Russian alliance challenging the West, history is not likely to repeat itself. Contrary to Putin’s hopes, last year will not be remembered as a year of successful Russian foreign policy.
Joseph Nye Jr is a professor at Harvard University and chairman of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on the Future of Government.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
China badly misread Japan. It sought to intimidate Tokyo into silence on Taiwan. Instead, it has achieved the opposite by hardening Japanese resolve. By trying to bludgeon a major power like Japan into accepting its “red lines” — above all on Taiwan — China laid bare the raw coercive logic of compellence now driving its foreign policy toward Asian states. From the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas to the Himalayan frontier, Beijing has increasingly relied on economic warfare, diplomatic intimidation and military pressure to bend neighbors to its will. Confident in its growing power, China appeared to believe
Taiwan-India relations appear to have been put on the back burner this year, including on Taiwan’s side. Geopolitical pressures have compelled both countries to recalibrate their priorities, even as their core security challenges remain unchanged. However, what is striking is the visible decline in the attention India once received from Taiwan. The absence of the annual Diwali celebrations for the Indian community and the lack of a commemoration marking the 30-year anniversary of the representative offices, the India Taipei Association and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center, speak volumes and raise serious questions about whether Taiwan still has a coherent India
Recent media reports have again warned that traditional Chinese medicine pharmacies are disappearing and might vanish altogether within the next 15 years. Yet viewed through the broader lens of social and economic change, the rise and fall — or transformation — of industries is rarely the result of a single factor, nor is it inherently negative. Taiwan itself offers a clear parallel. Once renowned globally for manufacturing, it is now best known for its high-tech industries. Along the way, some businesses successfully transformed, while others disappeared. These shifts, painful as they might be for those directly affected, have not necessarily harmed society
Legislators of the opposition parties, consisting of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), on Friday moved to initiate impeachment proceedings against President William Lai (賴清德). They accused Lai of undermining the nation’s constitutional order and democracy. For anyone who has been paying attention to the actions of the KMT and the TPP in the legislature since they gained a combined majority in February last year, pushing through constitutionally dubious legislation, defunding the Control Yuan and ensuring that the Constitutional Court is unable to operate properly, such an accusation borders the absurd. That they are basing this
RSS