Sometimes President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his government handle things in ways that make one wonder whether to laugh or cry. The administration’s handling of former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) request for medical parole has taken so many frustrating twists and turns that, in the end, no one will thank the government even if Chen is granted medical parole.
Chen, who has been imprisoned on corruption charges, is suffering from a range of medical conditions. Prior to the Nov. 29 elections, the government took a tough stance, but following the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) drubbing at the ballot box, it finally changed its tune: Minister of Justice Luo Ying-shay (羅瑩雪) said that the rejection of medical parole could be appealed or that a new request could be filed, and following two meetings, the 15 members of the Ministry of Justice’s medical evaluation team finally agreed that Chen should be released on medical parole.
But good things never come easy. After the medical team’s report had been organized by Taichung Prison, official documentation should have been submitted to the ministry’s Agency of Corrections. Although no one thought Chen would spend Christmas at home, that he would at least be home in time for New Year’s Day was not unreasonable. However, the ministry announced that Chen would not be released before New Year’s Day, because there was not enough time to review the documentation.
The reason given was that the car carrying the documentation from Taichung Prison was stuck in traffic and would not make it to the ministry during office hours, so the case could be reviewed only after the new year holidays. This clearly illustrates the government’s administrative inefficiency, bureaucratic stubbornness and inability to change.
If the documentation had been sent electronically, this farcical delay would never have occurred. Although the ministry insisted that there were many important attachments that could not be sent electronically, a review could have been initiated based on the electronically transmitted version and the final decision could have been made once the attachments arrived. Even though they were not transmitted electronically, the review team was well aware that the documents left Taichung Prison at 2pm, and that the trip to Taipei normally takes at least two hours. Even if delivery were delayed by a couple of hours due to traffic, there would still have been time to conclude the review if the ministry really wanted to let Chen spend the holiday at home, since it could have told the review team to wait a little longer.
Although this is a legal issue, everyone understands that it is highly political. If the government intends to use Chen’s request for medical parole to promote reconciliation with the opposition parties and promote social harmony, the constant interference created by “technical issues” that could have been solved easily leaves the impression that the government is procrastinating, unwilling to resolve the issue and handling the issue in a very awkward manner. Even if the government was trying to make a show of friendship toward Chen and his family, friends and supporters, that friendship will not be accepted.
Another victim of the twists and turns in the medical parole issue is former vice president Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), who is on a hunger strike in support of Chen’s release. Because of the government’s repeated delays, Lu has had to extend her hunger strike. She started her protest on Sunday, but due to the government’s procrastination it had to be extended until Wednesday. She has now been hospitalized due to health concerns. If her health deteriorates, that would also have to be blamed on the government.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS