It is nothing new to see Chinese media outlets producing dubious coverage of issues related to Taiwan and providing nothing to back up their claims — and the coverage of the talks between US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) at the APEC summit last week was no exception. What is surprising is that President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) rushed to back reports only run by Chinese media by saying that Obama had told Xi the US does not support Taiwanese independence, despite Washington making no mention of that in its statements about the talks.
Ma told the Nikkei Asian Review in an interview on Thursday, a day after the Obama-Xi meeting: “President Barack Obama also mentioned during the summit that the US is happy to see relations between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait improve, while it does not support Taiwan’s independence.”
Since he came to office in January 2009, neither Obama nor his administration are believed to have ever said on record that the US does not support Taiwanese independence. Ever since the declaration of Washington’s “three noes” policy by then-US president Bill Clinton during a trip to China in June 1998 — that the US does not “support independence for Taiwan, or ‘two Chinas,’ or ‘one Taiwan, one China’” — Taiwan gets the jitters ahead of US-China summits due to concerns that the two sides will make a statement afterward that harms the nation’s interests.
The pledge of non-support for Taiwanese independence, which can be traced to 1971 or earlier, when former US president Richard Nixon’s administration launched its diplomacy with China, has remained dormant for several years.
According to last month’s Congressional Research Service report by Shirley Kan, a specialist in Asian security affairs, the last time a US administration official mentioned not supporting Taiwan’s independence was in February 2007, when then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) began changing the names of entities as part of his “de-Sinicization” efforts to emphasize Taiwanese identity in the latter stages of his tenure.
Regarding the US’ stance on Taiwan’s sovereign status and future, Kan said in the report that Washington’s “one China” policy differs from Beijing’s version and that there have been questions about whether the US’ policy is one of support, non-support or opposition to unification or independence. In short, she said that the US’ policy stresses the process — peaceful resolution, cross-strait dialogue, with the assent of Taiwanese and no provocations or unilateral changes by either side — rather than the outcome (for example, unification, independence or confederation).
That means that although the stance of non-support for Taiwanese independence has been reiterated by various US administrations, it, along with other pledges under the “three noes,” was not a key statement made in the foundation of the complex interplay among Taiwan, the US and China. It was not put in writing in the US-China Three Joint Communiques, nor in the US’ Taiwan Relations Act. A look back at history shows that how US presidents have addressed the issue of Taiwan with their Chinese counterparts during US-China summits carries special meaning in the triangular relationship because it reflects whether and to what extent Taiwan’s interests are taken into account by the US in its dealings with China.
The coverage in Chinese media of the Obama-Xi meeting was reminiscent of the pair’s encounter in February 2012. At the time, Xinhua news agency reported that Obama said the US “rejects any call for Taiwanese independence” at his meeting with then-Chinese vice president Xi at the White House. Obama set a precedent by issuing such a strong statement.
Did Obama really say that to Xi again? If Ma did not base his remarks on the briefing of the Obama-Xi meeting that Washington gave to Taiwan, one is left wondering if there is a difference between Ma and China or if both are trying to stymie Taiwan’s independence.
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
The last foreign delegation Nicolas Maduro met before he went to bed Friday night (January 2) was led by China’s top Latin America diplomat. “I had a pleasant meeting with Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪), Special Envoy of President Xi Jinping (習近平),” Venezuela’s soon-to-be ex-president tweeted on Telegram, “and we reaffirmed our commitment to the strategic relationship that is progressing and strengthening in various areas for building a multipolar world of development and peace.” Judging by how minutely the Central Intelligence Agency was monitoring Maduro’s every move on Friday, President Trump himself was certainly aware of Maduro’s felicitations to his Chinese guest. Just
On today’s page, Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, questions the viability and advisability of the government’s proposed “T-Dome” missile defense system. Matsumura writes that Taiwan’s military budget would be better allocated elsewhere, and cautions against the temptation to allow politics to trump strategic sense. What he does not do is question whether Taiwan needs to increase its defense capabilities. “Given the accelerating pace of Beijing’s military buildup and political coercion ... [Taiwan] cannot afford inaction,” he writes. A rational, robust debate over the specifics, not the scale or the necessity,
RSS