The annual APEC meeting is one of the few international fora that Taiwan can actually participate in. However, this year things were different. During the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) representative, former vice president Vincent Siew (蕭萬長), the latter suggested that the premise of the so-called “1992 consensus” remained unchanged, while Xi reiterated that his opposition to Taiwanese independence was still intact.
Over the course of the conference, when Siew held meetings with representatives of other nations, he conducted these as bilateral meetings on the sidelines, too, as if the decision had been made to keep things as low-key as possible. When he returns to Taiwan, Siew should perhaps explain why he decided to emasculate the nation’s dignity in this way, and what considerations informed this decision.
This might just have been Ma’s special envoy’s cautiousness and his willingness to belittle himself. Meanwhile, Xi displayed his usual swagger and authority. He made certain concessions on items that had stalled China-South Korea free-trade agreement (FTA) talks during a meeting with South Korean President Park Geun-hye to bring the negotiations to a more speedy conclusion. He spoke to Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying (梁振英) about the imminent launch of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect scheduled for Monday, which the pro-democracy “Umbrella movement” had threatened to throw into chaos. In addition, the People’s Bank of China announced that it had signed a memorandum of understanding on Chinese yuan clearing arrangements with Bank Negara Malaysia, Malaysia’s central bank. For the Ma administration, which is keen to realize economic cooperation agreements with China, all of this activity must surely come as a slap in the face and an admonishment.
This was an opportunity for the government to evaluate its China policy and cross-strait economic relations, but all that happened was Minister of Economic Affairs Woody Duh (杜紫軍) talked, from the start, about how a third of all the nation’s exports to China are to be affected, and that a quarter would be at risk, if the cross-strait agreements the government wants passed are blocked in the legislature. The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) central leadership jumped on this as good campaign material, lambasting opposition parties for delaying or blocking the passage of agreements, and saying that those parties were the main culprits behind the nation’s travails.
This type of irresponsible behavior reminds people that the thing which affects domestic exports is goods trade agreements, and if these are such a priority, then what is the Ministry of Economic Affairs doing? Where is the government going so wrong with first the cross-strait service trade agreement and the cross-strait trade in goods agreement? There is no real disagreement with South Korea over Park’s policies, so why is it that Ma has the entire domestic services industry up in arms over his policy, with people perceiving it almost universally as an existential threat, one which they feel they must oppose and protest against? The government even attempted to violate the democratic process, trying to force the agreement through the legislature in a move that ultimately led to the outbreak of the student-led Sunflower movement.
The lead-up to the APEC meeting was overshadowed by the “will he? won’t he?” fuss over whether Ma would get to meet Xi, and this took away from preparations for how Taiwan could exploit participation in this international forum to express what the nation has to offer. It was obvious that Beijing would not make things easy for Taiwan.
The Xinhua news agency intentionally obscured the status of the special envoy, referring to Siew as the honorary president of the “Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation,” who was received by Xi in the latter’s capacity as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and putting Siew together with Leung, even placing Taiwan behind Hong Kong. The National Security Council ought to have been prepared for how to deal with eventualities such as these, but as it was, the Taiwanese contingent was at a loss over how to respond, and could only swallow its pride and bear the indignation of the rebuff. It was like the KMT had already given up on pretending the Republic of China still exists.
The Ma administration is putting national sovereignty to the side and allowing the Xi government to divest Taiwan of its sovereign status, in the mistaken belief that China would give it special treatment in economics and trade and consolidate contact between the two governments. However, Xi preferred to offer concessions to South Korea to get everything sewn up with their trade deal. Yet with Taiwan, Beijing has consistently tried to entice the nation with promises of bountiful rewards in what seem like peaceful and generous overtures, getting Taiwan to commit to what is essentially a trap before it goes in for the kill. Beijing’s idea of “peaceful unification” is a perfect example. As for Ma, who is constantly throwing good money after bad, how can he sleep at night, with what he is doing to the nation and to Taiwanese?
Ever since Taiwan joined APEC in 1991, required to participate under the name Chinese Taipei, not a day has gone by in which Beijing has not exerted some kind of pressure. Taiwan’s leaders have all had to participate strictly in informal leaders’ meetings. The Taiwanese understand this practical restriction, and so have not harangued the succession of governments presiding over this period to change the political situation.
However, they do ask that the government can bring up, during the course of negotiations, the special contribution Taiwan has made, or to reflect this in the agenda when the nation’s officials participate in these events, and that these officials express Taiwan’s desire to engage in international exchanges. The “1992 consensus” and “opposing Taiwanese independence” are not on the APEC agenda. Siew has said that he is fulfilling the remit given to him by Ma, but it is a remit for which there is no consensus in Taiwan. Ma’s betrayal of the Taiwanese is quite unconscionable.
Translated by Paul Cooper
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
The last foreign delegation Nicolas Maduro met before he went to bed Friday night (January 2) was led by China’s top Latin America diplomat. “I had a pleasant meeting with Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪), Special Envoy of President Xi Jinping (習近平),” Venezuela’s soon-to-be ex-president tweeted on Telegram, “and we reaffirmed our commitment to the strategic relationship that is progressing and strengthening in various areas for building a multipolar world of development and peace.” Judging by how minutely the Central Intelligence Agency was monitoring Maduro’s every move on Friday, President Trump himself was certainly aware of Maduro’s felicitations to his Chinese guest. Just
On today’s page, Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, questions the viability and advisability of the government’s proposed “T-Dome” missile defense system. Matsumura writes that Taiwan’s military budget would be better allocated elsewhere, and cautions against the temptation to allow politics to trump strategic sense. What he does not do is question whether Taiwan needs to increase its defense capabilities. “Given the accelerating pace of Beijing’s military buildup and political coercion ... [Taiwan] cannot afford inaction,” he writes. A rational, robust debate over the specifics, not the scale or the necessity,