During the previous presidential election campaign, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) accused the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of playing “dirty tricks.” They published a list of 16 such “tricks,” and even sent it to the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT).
However, the DPP is a bit cleaner than the KMT, and never used any of the tricks on the list. Ironically, four years later, the KMT has reached a dead-end, and has itself resorted to using the top tricks on that list.
The first trick on the list was “ethnic manipulation.” Because KMT leaders of Hakka descent are having problems holding on to their traditional supporters, they have resorted to labeling Hakka people who cannot speak the Hakka language as “false Hakka.” And formerly anti--communist military leaders, who used to rely on the loyal veteran vote, now say they will vote for President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), a father of US citizens, even if it is with tears in their eyes.
The second trick was “underground gambling manipulation.” While this is not something the DPP would ever do, the KMT is well connected in this respect. Its “squeaky clean” presidential candidate has admitted to meeting with a big gambling bookmaker several times, but will not divulge what they talked about.
Ma won the 2008 election because voters were beguiled by the pretty packaging, and because former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) had become a millstone around the DPP’s neck.
As Greater Taichung Mayor Jason Hu (胡志強) said, the KMT’s strategy was to focus on attacking Chen and completely ignore the existence of then-DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷).
Having cheated the voters, the new government denied Taiwan’s sovereign status to the outside world. Domestically, the ghost of the party-state began stirring again as the judiciary and the legislature once again became the tools of dictatorship. Government waste and corruption increased, justice and fairness went out the window and any emotional connection to the general public was severed. Ma’s re-election bid no longer enjoys any advantages: Everyone can see through him, and his vice president has become a pariah in southern Taiwan.
Amid accusations of donations from the bookmaker, Ma’s re-election campaign is in shambles because he and his running mate have no political achievements to their name.
Pan-blue voters are already fed up with Ma. Asking for their support for another four years is an insult to their intelligence. Faced with this dreary prospect, then, it is not surprising that the KMT would resort to the same tricks it once accused its opponent of.
James Wang is a media commentator.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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