There seems to be a perception both within Taiwan and internationally that connecting “Taiwan” with the UN is a taboo subject that will not only upset the current rapprochement across the Taiwan Strait, but also disturb peace across the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, the issue of Taiwan’s engagement with the UN seems to have become “the subject that must not be-broached” in Taiwanese policy circles.
This issue has probably become so politically sensitive because Taiwan’s desire for greater UN participation has been equated with its push for formal independence.
This is true even though President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has pledged that Taiwan would adhere to the principle of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” (the so-called “three noes” policy) in promoting cross-strait relations. This has arguably done little to dampen China’s suspicion that Taiwan’s ultimate goal in seeking greater UN engagement is to declare independence. Regardless of whether this suspicion is warranted, Taiwan has every right to seek full member status in the UN given that it is a sovereign nation that satisfies all four criteria of the Montevideo Convention for statehood under customary international law — a permanent population, a defined territory, a stable government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
However, in view of current political realities, the Ma administration has proposed that Taiwan participate in select UN bodies as an observer under the name Chinese Taipei with official government representation. This was the approach Taiwan used to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) and is known as the “WHA model.”
The WHA model is much less politically sensitive than pursuing full UN membership because Taiwan joined not as a political entity, but as a “health entity,” which is the functional and technical component of the “Taiwan authority” directly related to the constitutional concerns of the WHO; namely, world health. Hence, Taiwan’s participation is purely professional in nature and has little to do with its sovereign or independent status.
Although this approach has received mixed reviews from the Taiwanese public, it deserves a certain degree of credit for helping Taiwan to achieve official government representation at a UN forum for the first time since the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) were expelled from the UN in 1971.
Taiwan’s successful participation through the “WHA model” indicates that there is more than one approach to engage with the UN. To illustrate, there are non-member state and entity observers (the Holy See and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, respectively), inter--governmental organization observers (the African Union and League of Arab States), associate states with full membership in select UN bodies (the Cook Islands and Niue in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change), dependent territories with full membership in select UN bodies (the Cayman Islands and Aruba in UNESCO), non--governmental organizations participating as observers in select UN bodies and more.
This is not an exhaustive list and several of these options are not applicable to Taiwan. However, the list demonstrates that there is more than one approach to engage with the UN, each with varying degrees of political sensitivity.
Taiwan should adopt more flexible and creative approaches to widen its participation in the UN. One such method is to have Taiwanese civic organizations (businesses, academic institutions, think tanks, philanthropic foundations) participate meaningfully as NGO observers in the appropriate UN bodies. There are three main advantages to this approach: First, having Taiwanese participation and contribution despite the absence of formal government representation would allow Taiwan’s voice to be heard and its expertise to be shared with the international community. Second, civic organizations are not legal persons with the authority to carry out the rights and bear the responsibilities of a -government. Thus, the participation of civic groups will not, as some might fear, exclude the admission of the Taiwanese government to participate in that same organization. Third, civic organizations’ participation would not conflict with the “one China” principle, because a non-governmental entity cannot possibly challenge China’s representation in the UN.
The “WHA model” and the civic group approach are two methods in which Taiwan could become more broadly and deeply engaged with the UN, while minimizing the impact of the politically sensitive issues of independence and statehood. Thus, Taiwan’s desire for UN participation should not be equated with Taiwan’s push for formal independence and will not necessarily upset the delicate relationship across the Taiwan Strait. While these are rather unconventional methods for a sovereign state to participate in an international organization such as the UN, it is important to point out that they do not undermine Taiwan’s autonomy or imply that Taiwan is part of China.
Taiwan’s desire for greater engagement with the UN need not be such a radioactive issue shunned by both sides of the Taiwan Strait (and the international community at large) in the name of preserving the delicate Taiwan-China relationship.
I-Chun Hsiao is a commentator based in Washington and Jerry I-H Hsiao is a commentator based in Kuala Lumpur.
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