It is clear from the suggestion President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) recently made about the possibility of signing a cross-strait peace agreement that he is preparing to carry out the last wish of his late father as he lay on his deathbed, that he continue to work toward eventual unification. If the public lets Ma and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) go on trampling Taiwan underfoot, it will be the nation’s third major disaster.
On Oct. 25, 1945, dictator Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) representative General Chen Yi (陳儀) accepted the surrender of Japanese armed forces on Taiwan on behalf of the Allied powers in a ceremony held at the Taipei City Hall, now Zhongshan Hall. That followed the surrender of Japanese forces in China, which was accepted by General Ho Ying-chin (何應欽) in Nanjing on Sept. 9.
The KMT government designated Oct. 25 “Taiwan Retrocession Day,” but actually the Allies only mandated Chiang with the task of administering Taiwan, and China was not given sovereignty. That being the case, there was of course no “retrocession” of Taiwan to China.
Taiwanese at first welcomed the KMT government and army, but disappointingly the KMT did not treat Taiwanese at all well. On the contrary, they plundered Taiwan’s resources.
The KMT’s arrival was followed by the 228 Incident and the ensuing massacre. Then, following the KMT’s full-scale retreat to Taiwan in 1949, came the White Terror era and 38 years of martial law.
So Oct. 25, 1945, in fact marked the commencement of the KMT’s oppression of Taiwanese. It really should be called “Taiwan Downfall Day.”
That day was Taiwan’s first major disaster. It was not a “retrocession” and there was nothing glorious about it.
On Oct. 25, 1971, the 26th session of the UN General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority the resolution on the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, which was sponsored by Albania and 22 other countries.
The resolution was to “restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it.”
Following the withdrawal of Chiang’s representatives from the UN, Taiwan faced a severe challenge in its foreign relations. As of January 1971, 66 of the world’s 139 countries maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan, while only 48 had ties with Beijing. By the end of 1971, the ROC had only 52 diplomatic allies left. This number fell to 37 in 1973, 26 in 1976 and 23 in 1978. Today, Taiwan has diplomatic ties with 23 countries.
From Oct. 25, 1971, onward, Taiwanese have become refugees who are not respected in the international community. So that date could also be called “Taiwanese International Refugee Day.”
That day in 1971 should be considered Taiwan’s second major disaster.
“Taiwan Downfall Day” and “Taiwanese International Refugee Day” both brought great hardship to Taiwanese, so Oct. 25 each year should really be named “Taiwan Double Disaster Day.”
On this day, people must not forget the hardship inflicted on them in the 65 years since the KMT was exiled to Taiwan. Taiwanese should be aware that if they don’t get rid of the KMT soon, their days of hardship will drag on, with no way out in sight.
Kuo Cheng-deng is chairman of the Healthy Taiwan Society.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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