China’s war of diplomacy has never stopped, despite President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) claims that his modus vivendi policy has put on hold a contest to woo each other’s allies. If anything, all the modus vivendi did was to take the game to a new level, where instead of trying to steal each other’s allies, they have focused their efforts on consolidating their gains over the past decade.
The new phase of China’s strategy to consolidate its diplomatic influence worldwide can readily be seen in South Africa’s refusal to grant Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama a visa to attend the 80th birthday of Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
Although the African National Congress (ANC)-led South African government would likely deny Chinese involvement in the bureaucratic red tape that blocked the Dalai Lama’s visa process — which Tutu’s office began applying for in June — the evidence points to Beijing.
As Ela Gandhi, granddaughter of Indian independence leader Mahatma Gandhi and a former South African member of parliament, has said: “Everybody thinks this is because of pressure from China.”
“It’s very sad another country is allowed to dictate terms to our government. It’s going back to apartheid times. I am ashamed of my own country,” she added.
Gandhi was planning to present a peace prize in the name of her grandfather to the 76-year-old Tibetan leader.
China uses this same sort of under-the-table influence worldwide to keep the lid on Taiwanese independence.
If Taiwanese sports teams attend an event in a country allied with China, they are referred to as coming from “Taiwan, China,” or called “Chinese Taipei,” a designation that the Ma government accepts, but which does absolutely nothing to assert the country’s sovereignty or status. If Taiwanese movie directors go to a European film festival, they are also referred to as Chinese, even though their films might have absolutely nothing to do with the nation’s massive neighbor across the Taiwan Strait.
In a similar way, those who advocate Taiwanese independence might have their visas denied if they are trying to visit a country with which Beijing has close ties. Just ask former presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) or Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Chen had to fly loops around the world after the US refused to allow his plane to land. He eventually refueled in Libya.
The modus vivendi has done nothing but give Beijing the time and room it needs to consolidate its gains and squeeze Taiwan some more. In the meantime, many of Taiwan’s so-called allies are lining up for the chance to establish relations with China. However, before they do, they should view Tutu’s ill-fated invitation to the Dalai Lama as an example of what they can expect once they fall into China’s orbit.
China puts pressure on countries around the world to treat its enemies as their enemies. Simply inviting one of Beijing’s enemies to a party is enough to “hurt the feelings” of China’s 1.3 billion people, as the Chinese Communist Party would have its would-be allies believe.
Thankfully for the world, there are still fighters like Tutu, who don’t take China’s pressure on their country lying down.
A livid Tutu blasted the ANC after the government rejected the Dalai Lama’s visit.
“Our government is worse than the apartheid government because at least you would expect it with the apartheid government,” Tutu said. “Our government — representing me — says it will not support Tibetans being viciously oppressed by China. You, [South African] President [Jacob] Zuma and your government, do not represent me. I am warning you, as I warned the [pro-apartheid] nationalists, one day we will pray for the defeat of the ANC government.”
If only Taiwan could have someone to stand up to the Ma government and its overlord, China, the way Tutu stood up for the Dalai Lama.
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