The debate over the so-called “1992 consensus” is becoming increasingly bizarre, giving us a picture of the perpetual oddity we call Taiwanese politics, which always gets a tad more odd during elections.
Since a controversy has arisen about the validity of the so-called “1992 consensus,” you would expect those saying that it is indeed valid to provide some sort of evidence to back up their claims. All they have to do is show us a document or some sort of proof that verifies the existence of such a consensus. However, in a completely preposterous way, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his followers trumpet on with the utmost certainty about its validity, yet fail to provide any concrete evidence whatsoever.
What is even stranger is that the main semi-official representatives of the Republic of China (ROC) that met with People’s Republic of China (PRC) representatives in Hong Kong in 1992 — including then-Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) chairman Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫), SEF deputy secretary-general Chen Rong-jye (陳榮傑), former SEF secretary-general Shi Hwei-yow (許惠祐), as well as official representatives such as then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Taiwan Solidarity Union chairman Huang Kun-huei (黃昆輝) — have all publicly affirmed that no consensus was ever reached on the “one China” issue at that time. Even former National Security Council secretary-general Su Chi (蘇起), the person actually responsible for inventing the term in 2000, has admitted that the term “1992 consensus” was his own creation.
This controversy highlights the unrealistic way in which the current administration governs the nation. The “one China, with each side having its own interpretation” rhetoric that Ma so stringently pushes, somehow disappears whenever he faces China or the international community — the designation “ROC” is miraculously absent from his lips. While serving as Taiwan’s head of state, he is working hand-in-hand with the Chinese government instead of consolidating a consensus with his own people — the Taiwanese — and he uses the “1992 consensus” as a political tool for putting fear into Taiwanese if they refuse to accept it, saying that cross-strait relations will severely regress without it. Ma’s role as leader of the nation apparently means he’s only responsible for fulfilling his duties as KMT chairman and promoting an ideology of “eventual unification” with China.
The “1992 consensus” was originally an expression of indignation snorted out by China and the losers in the 2000 election, who were reluctant to accept defeat, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took power from the KMT for the first time in Taiwan’s history. China has taken advantage of divisions within Taiwan to insist on the “one China” principle and reject the possibility of any other interpretation, even that of the ROC, which Ma is so reluctant to stand up for, because both imply a concept of “two Chinas,” which Beijing abhors. Beijing has used every means at its disposal, soft and hard power alike, to establish the only interpretation of “one China” that it deems acceptable.
However, the most bizarre political phenomenon the Taiwanese have seen thus far is undoubtedly the president of the ROC treating other domestic politicians who happen to disagree with him as the enemy, berating them on a daily basis — even as a typhoon was hitting the nation — while treating the rulers of another country, who would like nothing more than to exterminate the ROC, as bosom buddies.
When the leader of a nation relinquishes all of his qualifications to run a nation, does it make any sense to let that leader serve a second term?
Lu Shih-hsiang is an adviser to the Taipei Times.
Translated by Kyle Jeffcoat
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