Are Taiwanese easily scared? Apparently so, at least in the minds of some politicians, who think they can secure public endorsement simply by trying to appeal to voters through creating an atmosphere of fear.
That appears to be the case in remarks made on Tuesday by President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in response to Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson and presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) cross-strait policy guidelines, which do not recognize the existence of the so-called “1992 consensus.”
Defending the consensus as the basis for maintaining the “status quo,” Ma said that discarding it “would create uncertainty … and would have a huge impact on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, especially in Taiwan.”
Ma, who is seeking re-election on Jan. 14, was implying that there is a high chance of war breaking out across the Taiwan Strait should the Tsai-led DPP — which does not recognize the consensus — win power.
The tactic of garnering public support via the rhetoric of fear-mongering is nothing new: Ma’s rhetoric on Tuesday reminded many of the volleys of intimidation that were similarly launched in late 1999 and early 2000 in the run-up to the presidential election face-off with then-DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
At home, there were threats sounded by the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) candidate, Lien Chan (連戰), and KMT officials who claimed that if Chen were elected there would be military clashes between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait within three years. Abroad, there were repeated warnings from Chinese officials, ranging from then-foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇) and then-premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) to then-president Jiang Zemin (江澤民), who, stressing Chen’s stance on national sovereignty, said China would not renounce the use of force should Taiwan seek independence.
That is without mentioning the missiles China fired into the waters surrounding Taiwan ahead of the first direct presidential election in 1996 — a move ostensibly meant to intimidate Taiwanese into not voting for then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), and a move which backfired.
We all know how these stories of saber-rattling and menace end. Not only did the Taiwanese electorate hand Lee an overwhelming victory in the 1996 presidential election, but Chen was elected in 2000 and re-elected in 2004. Moreover, there was no war across the Strait during Chen’s eight years in office.
Heeding these examples, which suggest the public does not buy into intimidation, it appears China has learned its lesson. So far no Chinese officials have threatened Taiwanese voters against supporting Tsai.
However, Ma is apparently still of the opinion that Taiwanese are emotionally vulnerable to the fear of military attack from China and he continues to blow the horn of a fear-monger when he says the cross-strait policies of his presidential rival could risk war with China.
Whenever election season rolls around, there are always politicians who resort to either lavish campaign promises or drumming up fear.
As the head of the nation, Ma should work to forge a public consensus through reason and fact, not resort to unsubstantiated threats with the sole aim of swaying support in his favor by exploiting people’s fear of war.
In recent weeks, Taiwan has witnessed a surge of public anxiety over the possible introduction of Indian migrant workers. What began as a policy signal from the Ministry of Labor quickly escalated into a broader controversy. Petitions gathered thousands of signatures within days, political figures issued strong warnings, and social media became saturated with concerns about public safety and social stability. At first glance, this appears to be a straightforward policy question: Should Taiwan introduce Indian migrant workers or not? However, this framing is misleading. The current debate is not fundamentally about India. It is about Taiwan’s labor system, its
Japan’s imminent easing of arms export rules has sparked strong interest from Warsaw to Manila, Reuters reporting found, as US President Donald Trump wavers on security commitments to allies, and the wars in Iran and Ukraine strain US weapons supplies. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s ruling party approved the changes this week as she tries to invigorate the pacifist country’s military industrial base. Her government would formally adopt the new rules as soon as this month, three Japanese government officials told Reuters. Despite largely isolating itself from global arms markets since World War II, Japan spends enough on its own
On March 31, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released declassified diplomatic records from 1995 that drew wide domestic media attention. One revelation stood out: North Korea had once raised the possibility of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In a meeting with visiting Chinese officials in May 1995, as then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) prepared for a visit to South Korea, North Korean officials objected to Beijing’s growing ties with Seoul and raised Taiwan directly. According to the newly released records, North Korean officials asked why Pyongyang should refrain from developing relations with Taiwan while China and South Korea were expanding high-level
Swiftly following the conclusion of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) China trip, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office unveiled 10 new policy measures for Taiwan. The measures, covering youth exchanges, agricultural and fishery imports, resumption of certain flights and cultural and media cooperation, appear to offer “incentives” for cross-strait engagement. However, viewed within the political context, their significance lies not in promoting exchanges but in redefining who is qualified to represent Taiwan in dialogue with China. First, the policy statement proposes a “normalized communication mechanism” between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This would shift cross-strait interaction from
RSS