What about Taiwan?
In a recent article, Dennis Hickey claimed that: “On Oct. 10, the world will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the revolution that overthrew the Qing Dynasty and led to the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC)” and “that Taipei is gearing up to commemorate the uprising with a series of major events” on Monday (“ROC is alive and well in Taiwan,” March 21, page 8).
At this stage of Taiwan’s democratic development, only the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), the People First Party, the New Party and the US should celebrate the misnomer that is the ROC government.
In the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses the ROC to bolster the nationalism necessary for its continued one-party rule. At the same time, in order to reverse the process of Taiwanization, former dictator Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) “communist bandits” have cultivated a symbiotic relationship with a pan-blue camp that shows more concern for the well-being of Chinese official Zhang Ming-qing (張銘清) than Taiwanese.
In addition, the US supports the ROC government rather than the human rights of 23 million Taiwanese, because unlike the Republic of Taiwan envisioned in the 1991 Democratic Progressive Party charter, the ROC endures Chinese and US pressures and the limitations of international capitalism.
Thus, although the US, EU and Japan may acknowledge that “the ROC provides China, East Asia and elsewhere with a model for political reform,” as of this year, the PRC is also the world’s second-largest economy.
Hickey asserts that the ROC exists because “sovereignty resides in the state” that “exercises predominant authority within its borders, possesses a relatively stable population that owes its allegiance to the ROC government in Taipei, maintains formal diplomatic relations with roughly two dozen countries and strong ‘unofficial’ links with many others.”
In anticipation of the presidential election next year, voters in Taiwan should ask themselves if the ROC deserves loyalty or revolution. This government habitually denigrates its sovereignty in the international community.
For example, in its mostly failed bids to join international organizations, Taipei attempts to assure Beijing that the ROC is less than sovereign. Thus, the ROC becomes, occasionally, “Taiwan, Republic of China” or “Republic of China (Taiwan).”
Hickey doesn’t address the cowardice of the ROC state, but instead points out that the lack of official diplomatic ties between Taiwan and the US places Taiwan in the illustrious company of North Korea, Cuba and Iran — other states that also exist.
However, whether the nation-state that is Taiwan, but identifies itself as the anachronistic ROC exists, is not the question. A democratic Taiwan and/or the ROC undoubtedly exist(s). The relevant questions are: Does an independent, sovereign Taiwan have the right to exist? If so, do 23 million Taiwanese have the right to affirm de jure self-determination?
Given the rise of the PRC, the recent destruction of Taiwan’s potential military ally, Japan, and lack of diplomatic support from the US, should Taiwan wait indefinitely for conditions conducive to Taiwanese independence, or create those conditions itself?
SOPHIA SOLIVIO
Northampton, Massachusetts
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS