Here’s a good tip. If you want to win an argument or debate, draw your opponent into discussing a subject of your own choosing, confining their ideas to parameters you yourself have set. A good example of this is the drawn-out debate on “two interpretations of the Constitution” and “a constitutional one China” that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been engaged in of late. I would say that the party has clearly allowed itself to fall into the trap.
Now that the five special municipality elections are over, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) have turned their attention, in a bid for unification, to the presidential election next year. The first salvo came in the form of advice to the DPP, graciously given and channeled through the pro-unification media in Taiwan. The two parties said that if the DPP wanted to get back in power, it would need to secure the approval of the electorate. This was by way of promoting the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), something they themselves consider to be a kind of cure-all for Taiwan’s economic problems. At the same time, they reminded the DPP that the rise of China was a fact it would have to face up to at some point, that it could not avoid having a cross-strait policy and that it might even be the difference between victory and defeat in next year’s election.
The so-called “1992 consensus” — the idea that there is “one China,” with each side free to interpret what this “one China” means — they said is a prerequisite for dealing with China and if the DPP continues to deny the existence of this consensus, it would have to come up with a solution for the cross-strait policy impasse. In short, if the DPP fails to offer an alternative, it will be very difficult for the party to return to power next year, or so their argument goes.
“Two interpretations of the Constitution” is the DPP’s answer to the debate formulated by the KMT and CCP. It is the “alternative plan” that it has come up with — the result of much head-scratching and brain-storming. The party is laboring under the delusion of being constructive, building a tower of its own design and locking itself in. That tower already has a name. It is called “one China.” I’m sure the CCP is observing all this, lips parted in a smile, because it is a tower that it wanted built anyway.
If the DPP uses the idea of “a constitutional one China” as a prerequisite to dealing with China, that idea will become set in stone and it will be impossible to change any “one China” clauses. This will be a significant victory for supporters of unification.
The pan-greens have to realize that the pan-blues’ challenge for them to come up with an alternative approach is, in itself, a trap. If they engage them on these terms, they will be caught in a trap of their own making. It’s also worth bearing in mind that there is no such thing as the “1992 consensus.” It doesn’t exist.
The very idea that “one China, with each side having its own interpretation” forms the basis for cross-strait relations is a conceptual trap cleverly concocted by the CCP and the KMT. First, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) invites DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) to state her position on the proposition at hand. Next, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) ups the ante with the threat that, without the “1992 consensus,” Beijing might have to rethink its current Taiwan policy.
The reality is that Taiwan and China were already communicating back during the -administration of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and didn’t need the “1992 consensus.” Moreover, didn’t trade between China and Taiwan really take off under the administration of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), with his “one country on either side” formula? What is it with all this talk of “prerequisites” since Ma took office? We are the only ones who stand to lose anything by continuing down this road.
Our approach and our discourse on cross-strait relations have been quite clear right from the start. We want peace, we want to participate as world citizens and we want to engage other countries in the world. At the same time, we want to work together with China on the common goal of having stable relations. Of course we see China as an important market, but we also want to be able to trade with the rest of the world too, for the good of our citizens. This is what we were doing in the past, before 2008, so why do we need to have a consensus now?
We need to escape from this trap laid for us by the CCP and the KMT to have the freedom to set our own vision.
Huang Tien-lin is a former national policy adviser.
TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
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