Every time Ukraine is mentioned, most people think of Chernobyl and the Orange Revolution, but the country has a lot in common with Taiwan, making a closer look worthwhile.
Ukraine’s independence was not followed by a period of transitional justice; power remained with the Communist Party until the Orange Revolution in 2004. The main players in the revolution were former president Viktor Yushchenko, President Viktor Yanukovych and former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko belong to the country’s pro-Western faction. They both want Ukraine to distance itself from Russia and move closer to Europe, and to join both the EU and NATO. Their base is in western Ukraine, a strongly independent area built on small and medium-sized enterprises and with a small wealth gap.
Yanukovych has his support base in eastern Ukraine, where big industry and the very rich are concentrated, and where there is a big gap between rich and poor. This is also where the large Russian minority is concentrated.
In the 2004 presidential election, Yushchenko’s popularity was at a high, and when he joined hands with Tymoshenko, it soared higher still. Yanukovych, however, had the support of then-president Leonid Kuchma, so the two camps were evenly matched. In the run-off election, the sitting government was accused of rigging the vote and public anger forced a second vote. Yushchenko won the run-off, in the “Orange Revolution.”
Yushchenko’s first decision as president was to appoint Tymoshenko as his prime minister, but less than a year later the two split. Yushchenko’s popularity dropped because some of his confidantes were suspected of corruption, the economy faltered and Russia picked a fight over natural gas for political reasons. Thanks to this split in the reform camp, Yanukovych won a narrow victory over Tymoshenko in the presidential election in February last year.
Although Yanukovych said the goal was still to bring Ukraine into the EU, he also pledged to improve relations with Russia. An agreement was soon reached, giving Russia a 25-year extension on its lease of a naval base for its Black Sea fleet on the Crimean Peninsula. The condition for the extension was that Russia forego some benefits by offering Ukraine a 30 percent discount on natural gas over the next decade. During the parliamentary review of the agreement, the reform faction claimed the government was selling out the country’s sovereignty and trying to cover it up, causing parliament to break into fisticuffs.
Although Yanukovych supports freedom of expression, most TV stations in the country sensed in which direction the wind was blowing and threw their support behind him. In addition, the government began to purge the opposition and several members of the previous government were arrested or brought to court.
Ukraine and Taiwan are both experiencing far-reaching social divisions because they are neighbors with a large country with which they share a language and ethnicity. In Ukraine’s case, some want to distance the country from Russia and join the EU, and in Taiwan’s case, some want to distance themselves from the US and join China.
The extension of the Russian lease for the Black Sea port was made possible because Russia decided to forego some benefits, just as China did when it signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. As the old regime was returned to power in both countries, they proceeded to attack officials of the previous government, strengthen their control over the media and break away from reformers. How these difficulties should be dealt with depends on the wisdom and choices of the public in each country.
Yang Shin-nan is professor emeritus of physics at National Taiwan University.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval