For many years it was an article of faith for the US to emphasize that in the Taiwan Strait it wanted the parties to adhere to the “status quo.” The main purpose of this was, of course, that the US wanted no change in a situation that has the potential to become a flashpoint. It was primarily directed at Beijing, counseling it to refrain from any aggressive moves against Taiwan.
However, during the administrations of former presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), it was also used by the US to dampen initiatives that were perceived as “rocking the boat.”
Lee experienced significant pushback from Washington in July 1999 when in an interview with Deutsche Welle he defined Taiwan’s relations with China as “nation-to-nation relations,” while Chen got a decisively cold shoulder from then-president George W. Bush’s administration in August 2002 when he talked about “one country on each side.”
Fast-forwarding to the present, during the past few months China has been working hard to change the status quo in two different ways: On the one hand, it has become much more aggressive, throwing its weight around in the international arena on issues such as global warming, currency valuation and border disputes with neighbors, such as Japan over the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台). On the other hand, it has — through its “peace offensive” toward Taiwan, including some concessions on issues like the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) — gradually drawn Taiwan closer to itself, away from the US and other allies in the region.
While US President Barack Obama’s administration, to its credit, has moved to counter China’s expansionist designs in other regions in East Asia, notably the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and the fracas with Japan over the Diaoyutais, it seems nonplussed by the rapprochement between the old adversaries, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT).
The US’ initial reaction was to applaud the “reduction of tension,” but it is gradually dawning on Washington that the present trend is leading to Taiwan becoming the weak link in the armor of democracy in East Asia.
Caught in the middle are Taiwanese, who worked hard to achieve a momentous transformation to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, but who haven’t seen that being translated into acceptance as an equal by the international community. The reason Taiwan ran into this stone wall was not only bureaucratic inertia (“There has been a ‘one China’ policy for the past six administrations”) or China’s rise and influence, but precisely because of the status quo concept that seems so embedded in the minds of policymakers.
A status quo is by definition a temporary, unstable equilibrium. The US may not want to change it for a while in order to prevent a move (ie, by China) in the negative direction, but the US is a nation that is built on the concept of change, so it should applaud a change away from the status quo in the positive direction.
What might such a change be? If there were more acceptance in the international community of Taiwan’s existence as a free and democratic nation; if there were acceptance by China of Taiwan as a friendly neighbor instead of perpetuation of old claims that do not have any basis in present-day reality; if the people of Taiwan were really able to determine their own future freely, without more than 1,400 missiles pointed at their heads; that would be a change in the status quo all would warmly welcome.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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