On Aug. 16, the US Department of Defense’s annual report on China’s military power came out. The congressionally mandated report is generally considered a good indicator of the US government’s policy toward China. This year it contained the typical unsurprising news as well as a few unexpected tidbits.
Much of the detailed information on China’s strategies and tactics had been discussed in earlier reports. As such, the main surprise noted in the report was that in spite of the “positive trends” across the Taiwan Strait (a reference to the efforts by Taiwan and China to move closer to each other economically), “China’s military buildup along its East coast continued unabated.”
This provides food for thought: If China were sincere in its engagement with Taiwan, it would have removed the missiles or at least reduced its military buildup. It hasn’t done so. What does that say about the intentions of Beijing’s leaders?
It would be good for both Washington and Taipei to reflect on this question. Washington is obviously doing so. That is why the Pentagon issued this report, yet even in the US there are those who are too preoccupied with the notion that the US needs China to “resolve” the world’s problems.
My response, based on my many years in the US diplomatic service, would be that we can only get China to play a positive role if we take a firm position and insist Beijing play by international rules, instead of letting it set the rules of the game.
To these people, I would also point out that the report makes it clear that China’s military modernization is as much aimed at countering US influence in the region. Missiles are specifically being developed to hit US aircraft carriers, with the purpose of “attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible US support for the island in case of conflict.”
The report also states that Chinese strategists are “looking at contingencies beyond Taiwan” and intend to expand the country’s military reach “deep into the Western Pacific,” up to the US territory of Guam.
Next, let’s look at Taipei’s reaction. Has there been a sufficient understanding of China’s endgame? The first reactions have not been very hopeful. A military spokesman stated that “the public has no need to worry,” while Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Lin Yu-fang (林郁方), convener of the legislature’s National Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, said there is no need for the public to be “overly nervous.”
These are soothing words, but they do not reflect the harsh reality that China is continuing to use military force to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, or as the report stated: “There have been no signs that Beijing’s military dispositions opposite Taiwan have changed significantly.”
If Taiwan does want to keep all its options for the future open — meaning retaining its hard-won freedom and democracy — then the public and the government need to make it clear to China and the rest of the world that progress in the economic arena needs to be accompanied by clear steps by Beijing renouncing the use of force.
Simply trusting in Beijing’s goodwill is not a wise thing to do. Taiwan needs to lay down markers on the issues that are important for Taiwanese. These are first and foremost the basic principles of freedom, democracy and the right to self-determination.
China’s continuing military buildup shows that the leaders in Beijing are not inclined to respect these principles. The Pentagon report is an important indicator in this direction and Taiwan needs to pay heed.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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