Recent statements by US Senator Dianne Feinstein about Taiwan and its relations with China caused quite a stir.
The statement that attracted most attention was a remark she made during a Senate hearing with US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on June 16, indicating that during a recent trip to China, leaders in Beijing had offered to “redeploy back” some of their military forces, including missiles, opposite Taiwan, in return for Washington not selling arms to Taipei.
The statement later turned out to be a dud. An aide explained that she was referring to an offer that was made in the past and was no longer on the table, while the next day US Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, when asked about the statement, denied that China had made any specific proposals along the lines indicated by Feinstein.
However, another statement by Feinstein actually gives more reason for concern. In a June 6 interview with the Wall Street Journal, she said of the sale of US$6.4 billion worth of arms to Taiwan, announced by the administration of US President Barack Obama in January: “I believe that’s a mistake on our part.”
It is difficult to understand why Feinstein feels that the arms sale is a mistake on the part of the US. It is a clear response to China’s continuing military buildup across the Taiwan Strait, including the ongoing deployment of missiles aimed at Taiwan. China has indicated in no uncertain terms that this buildup is designed to coerce Taiwan into reunification.
If there is a “mistake,” it is on China’s part: The leaders in Beijing are apparently underestimating and misjudging US resolve to help defend Taiwan. This is not only the political resolve enunciated by successive US administrations, but is also enshrined in US law — the Taiwan Relations Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1979.
Perhaps Feinstein feels that the US should not be engaged in an “arms race” across the Taiwan Strait or that it should work toward “demilitarization” in the area. However, history shows that unilateral reductions in arms and defense capability actually invite aggression. It takes two to tango, and China would have to show a clear willingness to reduce its arms buildup and missile arsenal arrayed against Taiwan for demilitarization to work.
It is a useful exercise to remind ourselves of other past examples in which an ill considered idea led to aggression and even war. World War II was precipitated when France, Britain and the US looked the other way as Nazi Germany laid claim to neighboring Sudetenland and used it as an excuse to invade Czechoslovakia and Poland.
In 1950, the Korean War — a war that I fought in — came about after (though not necessarily directly because of) former US secretary of state Dean Acheson left South Korea out of his “Aleutians speech” detailing the US defense perimeter in the Western Pacific. In 1991, a statement by a US official to former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein that “Kuwait is not important to the United States” is said to have contributed to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The message should be clear: If the US want a peaceful resolution of cross-strait conflict, it needs to stand by Taiwan, not only militarily, but also politically and economically. At the same time, the US needs to impress on China in no uncertain terms that its continuing military buildup is wrongheaded and a mistake on Beijing’s part.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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