Long before Sunday’s debate on the proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) argued that Taiwan cannot afford to be left out of increasing regional economic integration. Ma has made it clear that free-trade agreements (FTA) are a positive trend and that an ECFA would serve as a bridge with the region as ASEAN Plus One (China) and ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea) come into force.
The actual impact of FTAs with China on smaller regional economies, however, is only beginning to be understood. Still, early signs show that it might be wise to adopt a careful “go slow” approach.
A mere four months after ASEAN Plus One came into force, an FTA between six founding members of the organization and China, some sectors — such as textiles and garments, tires, steel and footwear — are already suffering in countries such as Indonesia, one of the signatories. Some garment factories in Jakarta have already gone under as a result of the flood of cheap Chinese clothing that have poured into the country. In some cases, the new competition drove down prices to such an extent that local companies were forced to sell jackets for less than they cost to make.
The chairman of Indonesia’s National Workers Union has said the trade deal could cost as many as 7 million jobs.
Representatives of the sectors that are at risk from the trade pact have called on Jakarta to renegotiate some aspects of the FTA or slow down the lowering of tariffs on certain products, calls the Indonesian government appears reluctant to act upon.
Still, if pressure from workers in Southeast Asian countries becomes strong enough as the negative effects of the asymmetrical FTA become more apparent, those governments may be compelled to turn to Beijing and ask for remedial measures. In the name of good relations and to protect its long-term trade interests, it is not impossible that Beijing would show some willingness to accommodate its smaller partners. The key reason is that all the members of ASEAN Plus One and ASEAN Plus Three are sovereign countries recognized by Beijing.
When it comes to Taiwan, however, an ECFA — which appears to be intended as a first step in the gradual implementation of a full-blown FTA — is not being negotiated between two sovereign states, since Beijing does not recognize Taiwan.
The long-term implications are worrying. Even if, as Ma has promised, short-term measures are implemented to mitigate the negative impact of an ECFA on vulnerable sectors of the economy and even if Beijing makes initial concessions on the “early harvest” list, China is far less likely to show flexibility over time. This is largely because it will look at that discontent and address it as a domestic problem rather than one between states. In other words, the mechanisms that normally apply to FTAs between sovereign states will not do so when it comes to Taiwan. Consequently, Beijing is expected to be far less amenable to renegotiation or goodwill once the pact has been signed, especially in light of cross-strait liberalization as a means to accelerate its unification strategy.
An ECFA will not solve every problem arising from regional economic liberalization and will undoubtedly create new ones. Although Ma prefers to address the matter as if it were purely a question of economics, the fact the two negotiating entities are engaged in an asymmetrical relationship economically and politically means that resolving those challenges will be all the more difficult.
Factory workers in ASEAN countries have difficult times ahead of them, but this could be far less onerous than the nightmare that Taiwanese workers in similar sectors could face five or 10 years from now.
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) were born under the sign of Gemini. Geminis are known for their intelligence, creativity, adaptability and flexibility. It is unlikely, then, that the trade conflict between the US and China would escalate into a catastrophic collision. It is more probable that both sides would seek a way to de-escalate, paving the way for a Trump-Xi summit that allows the global economy some breathing room. Practically speaking, China and the US have vulnerabilities, and a prolonged trade war would be damaging for both. In the US, the electoral system means that public opinion
They did it again. For the whole world to see: an image of a Taiwan flag crushed by an industrial press, and the horrifying warning that “it’s closer than you think.” All with the seal of authenticity that only a reputable international media outlet can give. The Economist turned what looks like a pastiche of a poster for a grim horror movie into a truth everyone can digest, accept, and use to support exactly the opinion China wants you to have: It is over and done, Taiwan is doomed. Four years after inaccurately naming Taiwan the most dangerous place on
Wherever one looks, the United States is ceding ground to China. From foreign aid to foreign trade, and from reorganizations to organizational guidance, the Trump administration has embarked on a stunning effort to hobble itself in grappling with what his own secretary of state calls “the most potent and dangerous near-peer adversary this nation has ever confronted.” The problems start at the Department of State. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has asserted that “it’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power” and that the world has returned to multipolarity, with “multi-great powers in different parts of the
President William Lai (賴清德) recently attended an event in Taipei marking the end of World War II in Europe, emphasizing in his speech: “Using force to invade another country is an unjust act and will ultimately fail.” In just a few words, he captured the core values of the postwar international order and reminded us again: History is not just for reflection, but serves as a warning for the present. From a broad historical perspective, his statement carries weight. For centuries, international relations operated under the law of the jungle — where the strong dominated and the weak were constrained. That