After the US government announced its arms sales package to Taiwan at the end of last month, US-China relations face a predicament that could engender a vicious cycle of retaliation and undermine the joint statement issued by US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) two months ago.
Some believe the reason for the increased tension is that China, which sees itself as a rising power, will no longer remain in the shadows, while others blame a return of US unilateralism. More likely, the tensions were caused by the US having excessive expectations, as well as misunderstandings and regrets.
First, the US administration’s expectations of Obama’s visit to China in November were too high, increasing US-China tensions. Since coming into office, Obama has distanced himself from the previous administration’s foreign policy and has made “smart power” his guiding principle, emphasizing listening, negotiation and contact. He has also stressed the importance of pragmatism and flexibility in mending the US’ international image and relations with other countries.
Before his trip to China, Obama said he was happy to see improved relations between the US and Russia, as well as European, Middle Eastern, Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. During a speech in Tokyo on his way to China, Obama said the US would no longer try to contain Beijing and that China’s rise was beneficial to global security and prosperity. In one fell swoop, Obama ended talk about China as a threat, while strongly legitimizing China’s peaceful development. These comments could be viewed as the biggest gift a US leader has made to China since diplomatic relations were established between the two countries.
The US hopes China will stick to the promises made in the Hu-Obama joint statement that included collaborating “to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive China-US relationship for the 21st century. We also agreed to take concrete actions to steadily grow a partnership between the two countries to meet our common challenges in order to contribute to world peace, stability, and prosperity.”
Obama hopes to use goodwill and reconciliation to build a friendly and cooperative partnership with China. The first test of this was whether China would stick to the agreement made in the joint statement, which said that the final document issuing from the Copenhagen climate change meeting should state that China will “provide for full transparency” on its measures to implement carbon dioxide emissions cuts.
The US views transparency as a Chinese “duty” and interpreted this to mean that China had made a major concession in the run-up to the UN Copenhagen climate change conference by accepting an international mechanism for monitoring emission reductions. However, China translated the phrase as “maintaining sufficient transparency,” which means that it views it as a “responsibility” rather than a “duty.”
As a result of this disparity, during the conference China refused to accept monitoring by an international mechanism, which ultimately led to a disagreement between the US and China.
These differences in interpretation of “duty” and “responsibility” led the US to misconstrue Beijing’s promises while also creating a domino effect. The failure of the Copenhagen talks compounded the popular belief that Obama is “too soft” and makes too many concessions to China. This gave Obama a taste of what it feels like to lose face and made him want to be tougher on China.
Google’s recent threats about leaving the Chinese market showed that Obama is not being soft on China, while the US Department of State’s announcement of arms sales to Taiwan and the way it has ignored the three Sino-US Communiques show how Obama regrets his joint statement with Hu.
However, this also means China has been compelled to step up the level of protest against such issues, also to keep face.
Given this atmosphere, the US and China will need to avoid conflict involving their core interests. This is essential for relations to cool down and eventually improve.
In addition, the US visit Hu had planned this April will have no real significance if China and the US do not make efforts to follow the text and spirit of the joint statement.
For China, the joint statement is a clear: formal recognition by the US of China’s position as a strong power. For the US, it underscores the belief that China accepts its promises about its international responsibilities and duties.
Whether the US and China can get the statement back up and running will not only influence the quality of relations between the two countries, it will also influence the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the future international power structure.
Emerson Chang is director of the Department of International Studies at Nan Hua University.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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