US President Barack Obama’s first visit to China caused a dispute between Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties over whether it resulted in an upgrade or a downgrade of US-Taiwan relations.
In my opinion, the structure, wording and spirit of the US-China joint statement issued by Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) imply the removal of certain aspects previously accentuated in the US “one China” policy. My reasons are as follows:
First, according to a US Congressional Research Service report released in August, the “one China” policy as reflected in the three joint Sino-US communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the six assurances of former US president Ronald Reagan’s administration maintained that the US does not recognize the People’s Republic of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, wants a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and wants to maintain a cross-strait military balance.
However, Obama and Hu said in their joint statement that “the fundamental principle of respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is at the core of the three U.S.-China joint communiques.”
In Chinese, “sovereignty and territorial integrity” is a term related to China’s “Anti-Secession” Law and slogans like “contain Taiwan independence secessionist forces.” The joint statement was tantamount to saying that the US respects China’s opposition to Taiwanese independence.
Obama’s statement has caused more harm than former US president Bill Clinton’s policy of not supporting Taiwanese independence. It also ignored former US president George W. Bush’s reasons for opposing the “Anti-Secession” Law.
In addition, the statement violated a stipulation in the TRA that “any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future is considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific.”
Obama’s statement does not tally with the US policy that the Taiwan issue should be resolved by peaceful means.
Second, although the joint statement did not explicitly say that Obama made concessions to China, it is noteworthy that he “commended the outcomes of the visit to the United States by General Xu Caihou [徐才厚], vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, in October this year,” and stated that “they will take concrete steps to advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations in the future.”
Xu’s US visit marked the resumption of China-US military exchanges, which were unilaterally suspended by China after Bush’s approval of arms sales to Taiwan in October last year.
The Chinese Ministry of National Defense said that during a visit to US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Xu was quoted as saying that the US arms deal with Taiwan was a major obstacle to China-US relations. If not properly handled, this would severely impact on relations between the two countries, Xu reportedly said.
Obama’s praise for Xu in the joint statement indirectly suggests that he recognized Xu’s stance on the matter.
If Obama approves arms sales to Taiwan after he returns to the US, he will put the US government in the predicament of policy inconsistency.
It would also be hard for China-US exchanges and cooperation to continue as proposed in the joint statement, and this would have a negative impact on Obama’s reputation and credibility.
Third, from a structural perspective of the joint statement, it was only after the US adjusted the emphasis of the “one China” policy and recognized Xu’s contribution that it was able to establish the foundation necessary to “steadily grow a partnership between the two countries” and further build a consensus on military exchanges, strategic cooperation and regional integration in response to global challenges.
All this indicates that China has secured a significant victory on the Taiwan issue and has made great gains in terms of Sino-US relations.
Obama’s intention to postpone US arms sales to Taiwan has also become clearer, while relaxed cross-strait relations provide Obama with a pretext for temporarily freezing an arms deal with Taiwan.
When asked by students in Shanghai to clarify his stance on arms sales to Taiwan, the US president said he was happy to see an improvement in cross-strait relations and hoped they would continue to improve.
Later, at a joint press conference in Beijing, Obama reiterated that cross-strait detente is in line with US interests. In other words, Obama believes the new cross-strait relationship is moving toward a peaceful and stable development and therefore meets US interests.
The implicit significance of all this is that the US has no intention of breaking the “status quo,” and does not believe that selling arms to Taiwan is either imperative or urgent.
In the face of these developments, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his government should not be overly optimistic. Instead, they must respond cautiously to Taiwan’s strategic marginalization by the US and China.
Emerson Chang is director of the Department of International Studies at Nan Hua University.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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