The latest game-fixing scandal in the Chinese Professional Baseball League (CPBL) grabbed major headlines the day after the final game of the championship series as investigators held interviews with players and conducted searches.
All those under investigation are top players, some of whom have played for US and Japanese teams. The one who has attracted the most attention is Brother Elephants ace pitcher Tsao Chin-hui (曹錦輝), who has played for US Major League teams. Tsao admitted that he had dinner with Tsai Cheng-yi (蔡政宜), the alleged head of an underground gambling ring, on four occasions, but denied that he had accepted bribes to alter his match performance. Nevertheless, it has been reported that the Brother Elephants management is reviewing Tsao’s team membership and seriously considering canceling his contract.
Baseball is Taiwan’s national sport, but enthusiasm for the game has waned considerably following a series of game-fixing scandals. The latest case is not to be taken lightly. It must be said, however, that the facts of the case are as yet unclear. Although their probe is at its initial stage, investigators have shown no restraint in making statements about it, even categorically telling the media that Tsao lied. These public statements have forced the Elephants’ boss, Hung Jui-ho (洪瑞河), to defend his team’s integrity by distancing himself from Tsao.
Scenes such as these are by no means unfamiliar to people in Taiwan. The guilt or innocence of a suspect should be decided according to the evidence. If the authorities suspect someone of a crime, they should investigate and prosecute that person according to the law. What they should not do is lay out every detail of the investigation before the eyes of the public. At the moment, prosecutors in the baseball case have not even made a formal indictment, still less have judges delivered a verdict, but that has not stopped the media telling us that Tsao “is very unlikely to get out of this.” At this rate, Tsao really does not have much chance of emerging unscathed, and the reputation of the whole CPBL is being dragged down with him.
When prosecutors charged Ku Chin-shui (古金水), a decathlete on the national Olympic team, in connection with an explosion and fire on a Uni Air flight from Taipei to Hualien that killed one passenger and injured 28 in August 1999. Ku denied any involvement, but was indicted nevertheless and found guilty by the Hualien District Court, and by the Taiwan High Court on appeal. However, the Supreme Court rejected the verdict and ordered a retrial three times, until finally, in July last year, Ku was found not guilty. Although Ku was eventually vindicated, how could he possibly be compensated for the years of tribulation he suffered at the hands of the judicial system?
Now Tsao is being dragged into a judicial maelstrom as the case becomes an ever-hotter topic in the media. As another Brother Elephants player said, it will be hard for Tsao to get back on the playing field after all this. That is true, but it is also very unreasonable. If Tsao has really done wrong, he must of course bear the consequences and the legal responsibility. If he has not, then obviously he should not be made to suffer because prosecutors got their case wrong. Looking back to Ku’s nearly decade-long wrangling with the law, however, we can see what is likely in store for Tsao. For the foreseeable future, in addition to being excluded from baseball, he will have to deal with a legal case that drags on and on and, perhaps even more unbearable, public suspicion.
Breaches of confidentiality by investigators and prosecutors are hardly news in Taiwan. Only recently, the Taiwan Bar Association and the Judicial Reform Foundation decided to monitor daily news reports and collect a long list of examples of investigators and prosecutors breaching the regulations in the Code of Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法) that stipulate that the content of investigations must not be made public. After collating the evidence, the two groups made a formal complaint to the Ministry of Justice. They did so in the hope that the way cases are handled can be brought under control to prevent further harm to innocent people.
The conduct of the game-fixing case suggests otherwise, however, as more and more confidential details of the investigation are leaked each day. A repeat of the Ku case seems to be on the cards. Perhaps members of the public should complain to the Control Yuan, or charge investigators through the courts for breaking regulations about keeping details of the case confidential. Maybe that is the only way of relegating the entrenched abuses of Taiwan’s legal system to the history books.
Lin Feng-jeng is executive director of the Judicial Reform Foundation and a lawyer.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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