President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has given the Dalai Lama permission to visit Taiwan to comfort the victims of Typhoon Morakot.
The government’s decision to allow the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader to visit came after Ma rejected a similar request last December, a move that at the time was widely interpreted as a nod in the direction of Beijing and part of Ma’s strategy to improve cross-strait relations. Ma could afford to do so at the time because he enjoyed strong support in opinion polls.
But things have changed drastically and Ma’s popularity is now at its lowest ebb. With the economy at rock bottom, his administration’s botched handling of Morakot, the bad press he received after several detached encounters with survivors and growing criticism of how he is dealing with a possible swine flu epidemic, the Ma camp has had to reassess its options.
Rejecting the visit of such a respected religious leader in the face of human suffering would have made the government appear even more heartless and could have dealt a fatal blow to Ma’s 2012 re-election hopes.
However, allowing the Dalai Lama into Taiwan sets back Ma’s pro-China agenda, which will be a problem for him at a time when Chinese officials appear increasingly impatient with what they view as his middle-of-the-road opportunism.
The Dalai Lama decision will make him unpopular in China, but Ma and his advisers have come to realize that how he is perceived by people in Taiwan is much more important than what Beijing thinks.
When he was elected by a landslide last year Ma was obviously confident he could win a second term, and he has made numerous predictions about his economic and cross-strait plans post-2012. But for the first time in his political career, Ma is having to come to terms with the fact that he is electorally vulnerable and that if he continues in this manner he stands a very good chance of losing.
Damage control must take precedent over policy.
The Democratic Progressive Party chiefs who invited the Dalai Lama no doubt did so with good intentions, but in the back of their minds they must have been excited about the dilemma this would create for Ma. The outmaneuvered Presidential Office must be quietly fuming.
The next test for Ma will be whether he meets the Dalai Lama, but that will be a bridge too far. Ma may have had his hands effectively tied behind his back when deciding to allow a visit, but a meeting between the two would be an almighty slap in the face for Beijing.
This will be hard for Ma, because not meeting the Dalai Lama will further harm his image in this post-Morakot era. The problem is that having tied up all his political capital in improving ties with Beijing, Ma will at some point have to tow its line in order to ensure the continued flow of “goodwill.”
The folly of Ma’s China policy has once again become glaringly apparent.
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