When the Control Yuan stood idle for just over three years from early 2005 following a pan-blue boycott of former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) list of nominees, commentators regularly expressed concern about the lack of checks and balances in government.
The watchdog body finally got back to work last year following the election victory of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and the approval of his nominees by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)-dominated legislature.
Since then, however, the body that is supposed to uphold the integrity of government hasn’t exactly covered itself in glory, producing numerous contentious and seemingly pointless verdicts.
On top of the contentious cases was the failure to censure a single law enforcement official over the excessive use of police force during the visit of Chinese envoy Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) last year and the initial failure last month to impeach former Government Information Office staffer Kuo Kuan-ying (郭冠英) after he admitted penning anti-Taiwan articles during office hours. An embarrassing U-turn on the Kuo case was performed only after a public outcry.
On the pointless side were motions like the one last month that censured the Ministry of National Defense over former army captain Justin Lin’s (林毅夫) defection to China — an incident that occurred more than 30 years ago.
Contrary to Control Yuan President Wang Chien-shien’s alleged comments in December that members should ignore unimportant petitions, or “little farts,” to concentrate on “big impeachment cases,” the Control Yuan seems obsessed with tackling inconsequential cases of graft among former government officials — people who, even if impeached, suffer no direct consequences.
While it is true that evidence of corruption often only comes to light after a particular official has left office, there is no point to such investigations if, as in the case of former vice minister of economic affairs (MOEA) Hou Ho-hsiung (侯和雄), no action can be taken.
The phrase “shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted” seems to be the most accurate description of the Control Yuan’s current purpose. It would be better advised to pass on any allegations of malfeasance to prosecutors.
To be of any value, the Control Yuan needs to monitor and tackle corruption within the current administration, but the lack of current investigations indicates either that the present government is as clean as Ma promised, or that there is a lack of mettle within the Control Yuan to investigate incumbent officials.
Members of the Control Yuan are supposed to be independent and beyond party control, but as the pan-blue boycott of Chen’s candidates and the legislature’s rejection of nominees deemed sympathetic to the pan-green side showed, the polarized politics in present-day Taiwan means government institutions cannot live up to constitutional standards.
The Control Yuan is responsible for censuring government officials at all levels, monitoring the government’s actions and protecting human rights, but if it is to be anything more than a paper tiger, then it should be truly independent. This is quite clearly not the case.
One solution could be to get rid of the Control Yuan altogether. After all, can anyone honestly say it was missed during its three-year hiatus?
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath