In a stark reminder of China’s persistent territorial overreach, Pema Wangjom Thongdok, a woman from Arunachal Pradesh holding an Indian passport, was detained for 18 hours at Shanghai Pudong Airport on Nov. 24 last year. Chinese immigration officials allegedly informed her that her passport was “invalid” because she was “Chinese,” refusing to recognize her Indian citizenship and claiming Arunachal Pradesh as part of South Tibet.
Officials had insisted that Thongdok, an Indian-origin UK resident traveling for a conference, was not Indian despite her valid documents. India lodged a strong diplomatic protest, summoning the Chinese charge d’affaires in Delhi and demanding an apology, while Beijing responded by reiterating its claim over the region.
This incident is not isolated, but part of a pattern where China uses border disputes to assert dominance, denying Arunachalis their Indian identity. Yet, Arunachalis have consistently affirmed their place within India, rooted in history, culture and self-determination.
Arunachal Pradesh has been part of India since colonial times, based on agreements such as the 1914 Simla Convention that drew the McMahon Line as the border with Tibet. China took part in the talks, but later rejected the line, arguing that Tibet lacked sovereignty, while India has always treated it as the legitimate boundary. The area, once called the North-East Frontier Agency, became a union territory in 1972 and a full state in 1987.
Its people — more than 26 tribes including the Adi, Nyishi, Sherdukpen (Thongdok’s tribe), and Monpa — have voted in Indian elections since 1952. Places like the 17th-century Tawang Monastery show Tibetan cultural links, but the region has been governed under Indian law for decades, and residents see themselves as Indians.
China’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls “Zangnan” (藏南) or South Tibet, rests on the argument that the region historically belonged to Tibet and was illegally annexed by British India in the early 20th century. Beijing rejects the McMahon Line as a product of “imperialist aggression” and views Arunachal Pradesh as part of China following its 1950 annexation of Tibet. The claim intensified after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when China briefly occupied parts of the state before withdrawing. China cites Qing Dynasty-era maps and nominal Tibetan administration, although direct control was limited, and the area remained largely autonomous under tribal rule. More recently, Beijing has renamed places in Arunachal Pradesh (11 in 2023) and issued stapled visas to residents, treating them as Chinese citizens, as in the case of Thongdok’s detention.
China’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh stems from a mix of strategic, resource and ideological motives. As a gateway to India’s northeast, bordering Bhutan, Myanmar and Tibet, it enhances Beijing’s border security and Belt and Road Initiative connectivity. Ideologically, it supports Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) narrative of reclaiming “lost territories” from colonial times, fueling nationalism. Economically, minerals like graphite and biodiversity matter, but the core driver is geopolitical: securing the Himalayan frontier to counter India’s alliances.
Arunachalis have never viewed China as their homeland, instead embracing Indian identity through cultural, linguistic and administrative integration. The region’s 26 tribes speak Sino-Tibetan languages, but practice animism, Buddhism and Christianity, distinct from Han Chinese culture. During the 1962 war, locals aided Indian forces, resisting Chinese advances, and post-war, they sought greater autonomy within India, leading to statehood in 1987.
Arunachalis express a strong pride in being Indian. This is further reinforced by Hindi serving as a lingua franca alongside tribal languages, as Arunachal Pradesh leads the northeast in Hindi proficiency, with many residents using it for inter-tribal communication due to the state’s linguistic diversity of more than 90 languages.
No pro-China movement exists; on the contrary, locals frequently protest Chinese incursions, as seen in the 2022 Tawang clashes. Arunachal Pradesh’s integration into India is evident in its full political representation: two Lok Sabha members, one Rajya Sabha member, and 60 members of its legislative assembly, who swear allegiance to the Indian constitution.
This patriotism shone during the 1962 Indo-China War, especially at Kepang La Pass in Upper Siang district, where Gelling villagers spotted Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) footprints near Nyugong Ri stream, alerted Indian troops, and sparked an eight-hour battle. On Nov. 17, 1962, soldiers from the Madras Regiment sacrificed their lives to repel the invaders. The villagers’ support — supplying food and intelligence — helped prevent a deeper incursion into the Siang Valley. Their heroism is commemorated annually on Kepang La Day, when prayers are offered at the Kepang La Chorten and Gelling Monastery honoring soldiers and locals alike as symbols of valor and unity.
Havildar Hangpan Dada from Borduria village in the state’s Tirap district embodied unwavering loyalty to India. The posthumous Ashok Chakra recipient single-handedly killed three militants in close combat during a Jammu and Kashmir operation on May 26, 2016, before succumbing to injuries. His sacrifice, untainted by any Chinese influence, is commemorated through memorials, bridges and tournaments named in his honor across Arunachal Pradesh.
Rifleman Jaswant Singh Rawat of the 4th Garhwal Rifles, who single-handedly held off 300 PLA soldiers for 72 hours at Nuranang in November 1962 with help from local Monpa girls Sela and Nura, who both tragically lost their lives in the fighting, embody this fierce resistance. Rawat’s posthumous Maha Vir Chakra and his unit’s battle honor “Nuranang” highlight Arunachal’s key role in India’s defense. These stories of shared sacrifice clearly show Arunachalis’ deep loyalty to India, not China.
Going further back in time, Arunachalis like Matmur Jamoh fiercely resisted the British Raj’s exploitative policies, including forced porterage. Jamoh led the 1911 attack on British officer Noel Williamson, earning a life sentence and deportation to Kala Pani Cellular Jail, from where he never returned. Similarly, Moje Riba, the region’s first Indian National Congress president, hoisted the national flag in Dipa village on Aug. 15, 1947, organized Gandhi-inspired protests and received the Tamra Patra award in 1972 for his contributions. These sacrifices from early anti-colonial resistance to modern times affirm Arunachalis’ deep allegiance to India, firmly rejecting any Chinese sovereignty claims.
Arunachal Pradesh is constitutionally an integral part of India, listed as a state under Article 1 and the First Schedule of the constitution, with its international boundary defined by the McMahon Line, consistently upheld by Indian courts and reflected in global cartography, including UN and US official maps.
China’s claims contravene the 1996 and 2005 border agreements, which prohibit altering populated areas. Incidents like Thongdok’s detention highlight China’s disregard for these bilateral commitments and international norms of good neighborliness. Yet such provocations have only strengthened Arunachalis’ sense of belonging to India. As tensions persist, India must continue to strengthen border infrastructure, enhance diplomatic engagement and rally international support against revisionist claims.
People of Arunachal have chosen India not through coercion, but through democratic will and shared destiny.
Dorjee Phunchu Dinglow is a doctoral student in the Department of African Studies at the University of Delhi.
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