On Feb. 27 the 10 ASEAN members inked a free-trade pact with Australia and New Zealand called the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, a 245-page document. Under the agreement, tariffs on 96 percent of products from Australia and New Zealand exported to ASEAN countries will gradually be eliminated by 2020, while other more “sensitive” products will either face reduced tariffs of 5 percent or be excluded from the agreement.
On March 5, in his official visit to Australia, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak met Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and agreed to launch formal bilateral negotiations on a free-trade agreement (FTA), the first round of which is set to begin in May. South Korean officials said that after the two countries sign an FTA, South Korea’s major exports such as cars and machinery parts are expected to increase. A joint study by private-sector experts from South Korea and Australia also showed that a bilateral trade agreement would increase the two countries’ GDP figures by US$29.6 billion and US$22.7 billion respectively.
This holds several lessons for Taiwan.
First, South Korea has become a member of ASEAN Plus Three and Australia has signed an FTA with the ASEAN organization. It is clear, however, that while Australia has become a free-trade partner with ASEAN, it does not mean it will automatically become a free-trade partner with South Korea.
Negotiations on an FTA between the two countries are still required. According to such logic, if Taiwan were to sign an FTA or an economic cooperation framework agreement with China — which is also a member of ASEAN Plus Three — it would be an overstatement to say that Taiwan could take advantage of that and join the ASEAN market or enjoy the same free-trade treatment with ASEAN members China does in the current international trade system.
Second, both South Korea and Australia are fairly strong economies. Although Australia is similar to Taiwan in terms of population size, South Korea does not ignore the Australian market, despite it having only half the population of its own country.
Even if its largest trade partner is China, South Korea has not pinned its economic development on the Chinese market, nor has it signed a free-trade pact with China. Instead, Seoul has sought to promote more of its products in Western countries such as the US and Australia, fully aware that income and purchasing power are keys to boosting economic growth.
By contrast, in Taiwan, both academics and politicians almost unanimously argue that relying on China is necessary to revive Taiwan’s economy.
Third, Australia and South Korea remained transparent and open when making important decisions regarding economic development and explained to the public the items to be discussed at the negotiation table. Australia and South Korea have also remained far more conservative and serious in the timetable for their negotiations. They have yet to give a fixed date for the conclusion of negotiations, although they have said that the first round of bilateral FTA negotiations would begin in May.
By contrast, the Taiwanese government has not made public the contents of its proposed economic agreement with China and has rushed to settle the negotiation timetable. This is hardly an optimal approach to defending national interests in international economic and trade talks.
Bill Chang is a certified public accountant and a doctoral candidate at the University of New South Wales in Australia.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
Minister of Labor Hung Sun-han (洪申翰) on April 9 said that the first group of Indian workers could arrive as early as this year as part of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India and the India Taipei Association. Signed in February 2024, the MOU stipulates that Taipei would decide the number of migrant workers and which industries would employ them, while New Delhi would manage recruitment and training. Employment would be governed by the laws of both countries. Months after its signing, the two sides agreed that 1,000 migrant workers from India would
In recent weeks, Taiwan has witnessed a surge of public anxiety over the possible introduction of Indian migrant workers. What began as a policy signal from the Ministry of Labor quickly escalated into a broader controversy. Petitions gathered thousands of signatures within days, political figures issued strong warnings, and social media became saturated with concerns about public safety and social stability. At first glance, this appears to be a straightforward policy question: Should Taiwan introduce Indian migrant workers or not? However, this framing is misleading. The current debate is not fundamentally about India. It is about Taiwan’s labor system, its
On March 31, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released declassified diplomatic records from 1995 that drew wide domestic media attention. One revelation stood out: North Korea had once raised the possibility of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. In a meeting with visiting Chinese officials in May 1995, as then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) prepared for a visit to South Korea, North Korean officials objected to Beijing’s growing ties with Seoul and raised Taiwan directly. According to the newly released records, North Korean officials asked why Pyongyang should refrain from developing relations with Taiwan while China and South Korea were expanding high-level
Japan’s imminent easing of arms export rules has sparked strong interest from Warsaw to Manila, Reuters reporting found, as US President Donald Trump wavers on security commitments to allies, and the wars in Iran and Ukraine strain US weapons supplies. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s ruling party approved the changes this week as she tries to invigorate the pacifist country’s military industrial base. Her government would formally adopt the new rules as soon as this month, three Japanese government officials told Reuters. Despite largely isolating itself from global arms markets since World War II, Japan spends enough on its own
RSS