Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Hsieh Kuo-liang (謝國樑) again demonstrated he is unfit to serve as a lawmaker on Monday with a proposal to amend the Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Act (電腦處理個人資料保護法).
Hsieh had already taken legislative incompetence to farcical levels in December when he visited Washington together with National Police Agency Senior Executive Officer John L. Chu (曲來足) and Ministry of Justice Counselor Chin Jeng-shyang (覃正祥).
On that visit — meant to allay concerns about alleged political meddling in the judiciary and excessive use of force by police during protests against Chinese envoy Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) — the trio managed, if anything, to increase suspicions that all is not well in Taiwan.
Hsieh was a national embarrassment as he tried to dismiss concerns of police brutality by contrasting the situation with Los Angeles in an apparent reference to Rodney King. Even more cringeworthy was his repeated claims in front of an incredulous Heritage Foundation audience that former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) had been charged upon being arrested.
That this man has been charged by the public with formulating laws would be disturbing enough without considering that Hsieh has been chairman of the legislature’s Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee.
Now, Hsieh has proposed an amendment that would allow elected representatives such as himself to access personal information about an individual without that person’s knowledge. The purpose of the change, Hsieh says, would be to facilitate investigation of corruption.
“If I’m in the middle of trying to expose corruption and I’m required to inform [the person] first, then I would have no corruption to expose,” Hsieh said in defense of the proposal.
Hsieh does not seem to realize that investigating corruption is not his job. Nor has he explained why he believes the nation’s existing mechanisms for investigating corruption — prosecutors and the Control Yuan — are insufficient. Hsieh would seem to be dissatisfied with the work of prosecutors and Control Yuan members, yet his proposal does not seek to correct any deficiencies with either of these.
Particularly risible is Hsieh’s claim that the new powers entrusted to legislators would not be abused because if the person doing the probing makes “a mistake in accusing [someone] of corruption, [they] would be held legally responsible.”
Hsieh is proposing that the legality or illegality of an act be established after the fact on the basis of whether an investigation succeeds in proving corruption. At what point should the furtive probe be considered illegal — once the person who was investigated is acquitted in a final trial? Or would an indictment by prosecutors be sufficient to determine the legality of a legislator’s secret investigation?
Establishing the legality or illegality of the probe would also be contingent on the elected representative going public with the information he or she has collected. The representative could in fact seek to collect sensitive information about individuals without any intention of making a public accusation concerning corruption. As long as no accusation of corruption is made, nothing would bring these actions to light, let alone lead to a determination of the action’s legality.
Considering the inappropriateness of this amendment, Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng’s (王清峰) response to the proposal on Monday was as objectionable as the idea itself. Rather than reject it out of hand, Wang said the ministry needed time to consider it.
Enough time has been wasted already. The government should take a clear stance against Hsieh’s proposal and the legislature should toss it out and move on to proposals with merit.
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