We should have known that something was amiss when, during Veneuzelan President Hugo Chavez’s inauguration on Feb. 2, 1999, he swore on the country’s 40-year-old Constitution by declaring it “moribund.”
Under “the moribund,” as the Constitution came to be known, Venezuela not only had eight peaceful presidential transitions, but also enjoyed the fruits of democratic pluralism and strong civil and political liberties. Of course, during this period Venezuela produced as much corruption and political irresponsibility as it did barrels of oil. Nonetheless, Venezuela fared far better than the average Latin American country. It wasn’t Switzerland, but, by anyone’s measure, it was a genuine democracy.
Not anymore. Elections are still held, but the legacy of Chavez’s decade in power consists, first and foremost, in the demolition of democratic institutions. Elected in a landslide to clean up the political vices of the previous establishment, Chavez chose to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
The previous regime, including its system of checks and balances and its tradition of political tolerance, did disappear, but its vices — particularly graft and demagoguery — became worse than ever. Pretty much like 10 years ago, Venezuela, once a destination for immigrants from around the world, remains underdeveloped.
More fundamentally, Chavez represents ideas that have long stifled Latin America’s political and economic growth. This includes the notion that social justice can be achieved only by abandoning the path of reform and rejecting “bourgeois” democratic forms in favor of “real” democracy, born of revolutionary purity and the leader’s millenarian dreams. That’s simply false. Though the Chavez revolution has made progress against poverty and inequality, it is hardly sustainable and reeks of patronage.
In fact, one can find similar achievements in Chile and Brazil, which have not given up on democratic checks and balances, political pluralism or freedom of the press, and have not enjoyed the luxury of US$300 billion in oil revenue in the space of one decade. Moreover, it ought not to be forgotten that between 1950 and 1980, Venezuela itself reduced extreme poverty from 43 percent to 8 percent of the population, one of the lowest figures in Latin America. It did so with democracy and freedom.
Chavez also repeats, ad nauseam, the idea that others are to blame for Latin America’s ills. This is the pernicious victimization narrative — still very popular in universities across Latin America — the late Venezuelan journalist Carlos Rangel eloquently refuted in books such as The Third World Ideology.
It is obvious that Yankee imperialism cannot be blamed for Venezuela’s emaciated tax system, dismally bad schools, rampant corruption, high crime rate and feeble political institutions. In all of these areas, Venezuela is faring poorly even by Latin America’s low standards. This is particularly true in the case of institutional weakness. When Chavez declares “moribund” a legitimate constitution, or when he proclaims l’etat c’est moi by declaring a national holiday to commemorate his 10 years in power, we see eloquent examples of a homemade institutional farce that would doom any country to the ninth circle of misery.
None of these ideas would fly, of course, in a contented nation. In this sense, Venezuela’s experience speaks to all of Latin America. The combination of economic growth (now in reverse because of the global crisis) and atrocious levels of inequality and social segmentation will continue to breed the same unmet expectations and social resentment that cleared Chavez’s path to power.
As long as Latin America’s democracies fail to take seriously the tasks of reducing inequality, spreading opportunity and nurturing more cohesive societies, they will continue to court disaster. To avoid this outcome, it is vital to purge certain reactionary and numbing beliefs, including the idea that reducing poverty obviates the need to address inequality, or that development is possible without introducing modern and progressive tax systems.
If the 10th anniversary of Chavez’s tenure can serve as a reminder of the perils that beset unjust democracies — especially now that a new electoral cycle in Latin America looms — then Venezuela’s agonizing recent history would, at least, be redeemed.
Kevin Casas-Zamora was Costa Rica’s vice president and minister of national planning and economic Policy in 2006 and 2007, and is a senior fellow in foreign policy at The Brookings Institution in Washington.
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