The Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration’s basic idea for cross-strait interaction is the so-called “1992 consensus” and getting each side of the Taiwan Strait to abstain from denying the existence of the other. There was some understanding for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) not agreeing to these premises and goals, but anyone who could or would be willing to understand the Ma administration’s actions is totally confused.
The administration considers it reasonable to remain silent or protest in a low-key manner when President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is referred to as “Mr” by China or when Beijing calls the Republic of China (ROC) the “Taiwan Area,” but harshly refutes any statements that Taiwan is a province or a part of China. But in what way is it respectful to the presidency and the ROC when Ma says that he is comfortable being referred to as “Mr Ma” and when he refers to Taiwan as an “area?”
Apart from terrifying the DPP, Ma has probably made the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) happy beyond its wildest dreams. How could this be construed as mutual non-denial? It is outright self-denial!
Ma’s handling of other matters has also left the public stunned and speechless. His administration was “pragmatic” to the point of humiliating Taiwan in seeking admission to the UN’s specialized organizations. When Chinese Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya (王光亞) rejected Taiwan’s entrance, Taipei should have issued a strong protest. The Presidential Office spokesperson, however, spoke up for China as if he was the spokesperson for Beijing’s UN delegation.
Then there was Ma’s backtracking on national defense. Taiwan has cruise missiles with a reach of 500km to 600km, capable of attacking military facilities along the Fujian coast. We were about to make a breakthrough in the development of the Hsiung Feng 2E cruise missile, which would have reached of 800km to 1,000km, and would allow Taiwan to hit second-line military facilities such as airports.
A reasonable military strategy would dictate that development of these missiles be completed. If substantial military concessions are made between China and Taiwan, we could consider maintaining existing capability but forego mass production and deployment. However, considering China’s rapid increases in national defense spending, research and development and expanding deployments, the Ma administration had no reason to stop the Hsiung Feng 2E program. The Chinese probably didn’t believe their ears. Unfortunately for Taiwan, it was all too true.
When the DPP was in power, the national strategy was to maintain a clear definition of Taiwanese sovereignty and to state that there was one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait. This was in line with mainstream public opinion. However, this strategy caused a freeze in cross-strait relations and hurt relations between the pan-green and pan-blue camps as well as between China, the US and Taiwan.
The Ma administration has a different strategy and maybe they cannot be blamed for making the change given eight years of chilly relations. However, the government has gone directly against Taiwan’s sovereign interests and mainstream public opinion.
Simply put, the former Chen administration was characterized by a clear stance, but its overly hasty policies and rash actions hurt Taiwan’s interests and the feelings of the public.
Ma, however, has severely damaged Taiwan’s sovereignty, its fundamental interests and planted the seeds for long-term mistrust. The only way to resolve these problems is by kicking Ma out of office!
Lee Wen-chung is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
Translated by Drew Cameron
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS