Russia recently shocked the world. With a swift show of military might it steamrolled into Georgia, grabbed key strategic locations and took aim at punishing what it considers an annoying democratic gnat at its doorstep.
The timing was perfect: Russia’s neighbor China, one that also cares little for democracy, was hosting the Olympics, a good distraction for all.
US President George W. Bush, the leader of the free world, was enjoying the Games. He gave a condemnatory speech and went back to enjoying the Olympics. The world remained shocked, but how shocked should it be?
Some took the occasion to express concern that this aggression would give China a precedent in regard to Taiwan.
Let me present a counter-argument. It has been the US State Department’s mishandling of the cross-strait issue that has set the precedent for the Georgian situation: It is caught in its own double standard.
So what gave Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin the confidence to give the orders to attack? What possible link could this have with China/Taiwan? What had Russia seen? Examine this scenario.
In a mystifying example of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing, the US has continued to treat China and Russia in totally different, inconsistent ways, politically, economically and academically.
What does academia have to do with this? Sadly, it is often from the halls of academia that so many of the “expert” advisers for US foreign policy are drawn.
US academics in Russian studies have always been able to separate culture from government. They appreciate art, architecture, writing, culture and so on but often condemn Russian authoritarian rule.
With China it is the opposite. US Sinologists have become so enamored with the so-called mystique of Chinese culture that they use this to make excuses for authoritarian rule.
Who has not heard this refrain: “See how far China has come in the last century”? Has a similar refrain about Russia ever been uttered?
As US Sinologists seek paid-up invitations to Chinese universities and government backing for their research, they go to great lengths to defend and explain how the country is being misunderstood.
You don’t find this pandering among Russian academics.
From another angle, one cannot find Russian Sinologists as enthralled with China as their US counterparts. No Russian Sinologists or advisers suffer from a debilitating awe of Chinese culture or tradition; they have a sounder base in reality.
In economics, Russia and China have a large workforce that can be exploited and utilized. Why then does the US approach China economically as a key part of its policy of engagement and growth?
True, former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger started this ball rolling when Russia was seen to be a greater threat, but that is long past and glasnost came in its wake.
China has not had its glasnost, but the US pretends it has and has made China the factory of the world.
To gain a few more dollars, US corporations have been willing to accept poisoned toys and pet food from China. You would never find that kind of deal made with Russia.
The US approaches Russia in a confrontational way, but it engages and placates China. Why?
Consider how the US-led NATO has pushed itself far beyond Berlin and the former East Germany.
Russia is seen as a major threat; China on the other hand is eagerly accommodated even though it grows every year in military strength.
Enter the revealing case of Taiwan, a similarly annoying democratic gnat, but this time on the doorstep of China.
It is now more than 60 years since the end of World War II and Taiwan has created for itself a vibrant democracy. Ironically, while the US State Department openly celebrates Georgia’s democracy and its independence from Russia, it officially states that Taiwan’s status is “undetermined.” It won’t even touch on Taiwanese independence.
“Undetermined”: this is the answer you get when US state officials are pressed hard for comment.
More often than not, however, they mouth the mantra of “We have a one-China policy.” It is a policy whose actual meaning is understood by only a few.
In practice, the majority acquiesces to China’s interpretation of what “one China” means. The media all over the world are party to this acquiescence; few outlets have the integrity to challenge this utterance.
Bush has publicly met with Georgia’s president; Taiwan’s president is treated like a pariah. Taiwan’s democracy, like an unwanted stepchild, is pushed to the back of the line.
In its embarrassment, the US State Department wishes that Taiwan would shut up about its membership in the democratic global family because it hampers the US pipedream policy of engagement with China.
Perhaps this explains why the US State Department is enamored of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九): He cares little for his title of president, still less for Taiwan’s sovereignty.
How does this translate for Russia?
Taiwan’s democracy and independence are not a matter of principle for the US; Taiwan is a pawn, a bargaining chip that Washington has used in the game of Russian containment started by Kissinger and US president Richard Nixon.
Putin sees through this and is not afraid to challenge it. He senses that if the US will play an accommodating game with China, a lesser power than Russia, then it won’t confront Russia when the chips are down.
Authoritarianism is authoritarianism regardless of its cloak, but the US has been entirely inconsistent in acknowledging it — and Putin exposes this.
States have different strategies. Russia does not have the finesse and patience to master the long term duplicity of China; it does not need it, because Russia’s style is an overt Machiavellianism. It will first try extortion and blackmail; if these fail it resorts to ham-fisted action, as with Georgia.
The US State Department tries to condemn the authoritarian devil in Russia and dance with the same devil in China.
But Russia won’t let the US have it both ways. Bush should be well aware of that old Texas saying: “If you dance with the Devil, it’s not the Devil that changes.”
Putin may not be from Texas, but he knows this. And he knows that Bush is faking it.
And what of the US State Department? It has been dancing for so long with the Devil since the Shanghai Communique that it has lost track of its goal. Instead, it is playing an unprincipled game of convenience — and Russia has called its bluff.
This is not a plea that the US should be the world’s policeman, nor am I saying that war should be declared if a democracy is threatened.
What is needed is consistent policy. You can’t have the economic cake of China and eat it. Selective accommodation won’t work.
If a lesser power like China is accommodated, Russia knows it can demand the same.
Jerome Keating is a Taiwan-based writer.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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