An array of intelligence analysts, Asian and US scholars, think tank specialists and workers in relief organizations have renewed speculation that the North Korean regime of Kim Jong-il is in danger of collapsing because the country is on the brink of mass starvation and mounting isolation.
No one is willing to guess when this might happen: within a year, five years or 10 years? Will the collapse be a “soft landing,” in which Kim’s regime gradually falls apart and the pieces are picked up by the South Koreans, or will it be a “hard landing,” in which Kim’s regime implodes and chaos sweeps the land?
The consequences of a regime change in Pyongyang could be staggering. Immediately, US, South Korean and Chinese troops could charge into North Korea to secure its nuclear facilities — and confront each other. In the middle term, reviving North Korea could cost South Korea, Japan, China and the US enormous sums. In the long term, a reunited Korea would change the power balance of East Asia — but unpredictably.
Analysts point to a decade of hunger that has left seven-year-old North Korean children 20cm shorter and 9kg lighter than their South Korean cousins. North Korean soldiers in a regime that gives priority to the military forces have been reduced to two skimpy meals a day. Factory workers nap on the floor for lack of food and energy.
That has led to conjecture that North Koreans, despite the pervasive controls in the Hermit Kingdom’s police state, may throw caution to the wind.
“We just don’t think they can go along with this much longer,” said a US official with access to intelligence assessments.
The Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington reports that North Korea, after ten years of food shortages, stands on the precipice of famine that could have political consequences.
“The possibility of widespread social distress and even political instability,” the institute said in a study, “cannot be ruled out.”
Another study, from the non-partisan US Congressional Research Service, says: “Dismal economic conditions also foster forces of discontent that potentially could turn against the Kim regime — especially if knowledge of the luxurious lifestyle of communist party leaders becomes better known or as poor economic performance hurts even the elite.”
Even so, an assessment from Jane’s, publisher of security reports, said five years ago: “The only significant power base that might challenge the regime is the military. Since Kim Jong Il became Chairman of the National Defense Commission, however, he has promoted 230 generals. Most of the army’s 1,200-strong general officer corps owes their allegiance to him.”
Nothing appears to have changed that judgment — except starvation.
Added to the pressures on the regime is the increasing isolation of Pyongyang. The six-party talks among North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the US, which are intended to persuade Kim to give up his nuclear ambitions, are stalled with no end in sight.
China and Russia no longer seem to have an ideological commitment to their fellow communists in North Korea and were clearly miffed when North Korea detonated a nuclear device in 2006. Japan has begun to negotiate warily with North Korea to get an accounting of the Japanese it kidnapped over a long period. Most sanctions remain in place.
Seoul’s contacts with North Korea slowed after, among other things, a North Korean soldier killed a South Korean woman taking an early morning walk on a beach near the North Korean resort she was visiting. Moreover, South Korean young people have shown less interest in reconciliation with North Korea than their parents and grandparents because of the cost.
Officials of the administration of US President George W. Bush are going through the motions of negotiating with the North Koreans for an enforceable agreement under which Kim would give up his nuclear weapons. In return, he would get a peace agreement replacing the truce that ended the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, diplomatic relations with the US and aid and trade benefits. But little real progress is in sight.
The opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, a political event if ever there was one, reflected power relations in East Asia. Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) was the host, of course. Bush was there along with his father, former US president George Bush. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak also attended.
Kim wasn’t there.
Richard Halloran is a writer based in Hawaii.
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