When Beijing's hegemonic epithet for Taiwan's Olympic team made an unwelcome reappearance on China Central Television (CCTV) over the weekend, the response by the Taiwanese government was equally disappointing.
Reporting on taekwondo gold medalist Chu Mu-yen (朱木炎), CCTV again swapped the nation’s official Olympic name for Zhongguo Taibei. An apology from Beijing seems unlikely, however, judging from the Presidential Office’s timid statement on Sunday.
The re-emergence of this contrived moniker was bad news for President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who only a week earlier said that China had agreed to end its name game and so declared a diplomatic victory for his administration. For Ma, Beijing’s about-face was a scarce and sorely needed gesture of “goodwill” to combat critics at home who have said cross-strait “compromise” is a one-way street.
That may be why the office was reluctant to raise its voice over CCTV’s recent decision to keep using the non-official title, lest it erase the earlier triumph. Instead, the Presidential Office said it would monitor the situation, adding that CCTV had reportedly admitted to a “technical error.”
The government is not alone in its reluctance to react. Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄), who last month bristled at the name change, is now strangely quiet. Wu had said he would cancel his trip to attend the Olympics if China continued to play “word games.”
But choosing not to issue an immediate protest this time was a risky tactic for Ma. The administration’s stern objection to altering Taiwan’s Olympic name was as important for the president’s image at home as it was for building trust with Beijing. Silence on the issue now could be interpreted as spinelessness, further compromising the nation’s bargaining position with China and eroding Ma’s already sagging approval ratings.
The timing was also awkward for Ma, who, on the same day as the Presidential Office’s ineffectual response to CCTV, touted his administration’s diplomatic prowess to a group of former foreign ministers. At a dinner honoring the officials, Ma sung the praises of agreeing to disagree, saying that his modus vivendi approach to foreign policy had already paid off.
But there is cause to object to this recurring theme. When Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office first dreamed up Zhongguo Taibei, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平), after meeting with the president and premier, called on China to remember its consensus with Taiwan to set aside disputes. Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that Beijing sees itself as having reached any such deal. Instead, China seems more interested in testing the waters to see just how eager the new government is to maintain a show of “mutual goodwill.”
On Sunday, Ma said his “practical” approach would “protect the interests of the Republic of China” and “restore mutual trust” with other governments. The strategy had already improved relations with China as well as with allied nations, he said.
The sum of Ma’s many conciliatory remarks, however, has not put a stop to Beijing’s encroachment on Taiwan’s identity and international space. In that context, soft reactions to provocations like CCTV’s “error” may be setting the nation up for a hard fall when it becomes clear that Beijing was never interested in agreeing to disagree.
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