On June 10, a Taiwanese fishing boat sank after colliding with a Japanese patrol boat near the Diaoyutai (釣魚台) islands. With talks between the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) having just resumed, this incident occurred at a very awkward time.
Taipei’s reaction has upset the balance of relations between Taiwan and the US, Japan and China and will have ramifications for security in East Asia after the Beijing Olympics in August.
The Diaoyutai issue is not just about bilateral relations between Taiwan and Japan, but has affected relations between Taiwan and the US-Japan alliance and between Taiwan and China.
The US has not gotten involved in the Diaoyutai territorial dispute, but it does recognize that Japan has jurisdiction over the islands. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan states that the agreement includes all Japanese territory and areas under Japanese jurisdiction.
In September 1996, the unclear stance of the US on the Diaoyutais caused a crisis in the US-Japan alliance. In February 2004, when there were rumors that Chinese ships wanted to anchor at the Diaoyutai islands, the administration of US President George W. Bush made it immediately clear that the islands were included among the territories outlined in the US-Japan treaty. Because China knows that the Diaoyutai issue could upset the US-Japan alliance, it has been cautious since 2005.
Before Taiwan sends warships to the Diaoyutais to stake its claim, it must understand the strategic relations between Taiwan and other countries that could be affected by such a move.
Taiwan must not lose sight of the bigger picture as it handles the Diaoyutai issue. By arguing over the island chain, Taiwan could undermine its own sovereignty and lose its sway completely. China’s claim to the Diaoyutais is essentially an extension of its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Joining China’s protest against Japan is therefore equivalent to admitting that Taiwan is part of China and accepting that Beijing represents it on this issue.
If China represents Taiwan on this issue, it is the same as saying that China can represent Taiwan in general.
Japan does not accept the concept of “one China, with each side having its own interpretation.” It recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole representative of China. Therefore, if Taiwan presented itself as part of China, Tokyo would discuss the Diaoyutais with Beijing alone and exclude Taiwan from the negotiations.
Keeping strong relations with the US-Japan alliance is in the nation’s strategic interests and this can explain why the stance of former presidents Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was not to relinquish sovereignty over the Diaoyutais, but to seek to resolve the matter peacefully and to view it as a bilateral issue between Taiwan and Japan.
Both Lee and Chen were loath to upset the balance in the relationships between Taiwan, the US and Japan over this issue and did not want to risk harming the nation’s in the eyes of the international community. This stance allowed the nation to retain a voice in the dispute over the islands.
So how should we handle the Diaoyutai dispute? Should we make it a sovereignty issue and turn against the US-Japan alliance, damaging Taiwan’s overall strategic interests? Or should we look at the issue from a humanitarian angle and focus on Japan’s mishandling of the collision and its responsibility for this incident in a controversial region, and draw up clear regulations acceptable to both sides to deal with future incidents?
If the nation proceeds correctly, it can use this incident to strengthen mutual trust between Taiwan and the US-Japan alliance. That would also allow Taiwan to face China on more solid ground, with better bargaining chips as cross-strait talks deepen. That would not only benefit our interests, but also help establish a stable framework for cross-strait interaction, while also leading the US-Japan alliance to seek closer ties with Taiwan.
Taiwan could eventually see China and the US-Japan alliance competing for strong relations with Taiwan, just as China and Russia vied for ties with the US in the early 1970s thanks to the efforts of then-US secretary of state Henry Kissinger.
At a time when China is exercising self-control to build a better relationship with the US and Japan, Taiwan should not do the opposite; otherwise, the nation’s relationship with both China and the alliance could suffer. If we can be cautious and creative and maintain a good relationship with China and the alliance, Taiwan could eventually benefit from this incident.
President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration should make it clear that they are not motivated by anti-Japanese sentiment and should handle the case with the overall situation in East Asia in mind.
As for the DPP, this incident is an opportunity to demonstrate its strategic skills to the public. If the party echoes anti-Japanese sentiment, they will be unable to do so and will damage national interests.
Lai I-chung is an executive committee member of the Taiwan Thinktank.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON AND EDDY CHANG
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