In his inaugural address last Tuesday, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) sought to sweep away eight years of gloom and to set a cautious, yet optimistic, foundation for three-way relations between Taiwan, China and the US. But while Ma has bid farewell to the past, new and difficult problems have emerged.
Through a multi-layered strategic approach in his inaugural speech, Ma used security and trade relations between Taiwan and the US as backup and the potential for another power transfer as bargaining chips in an attempt to seek cross-strait negotiations with Beijing on highly sensitive issues such as the threat of Taiwan’s marginalization in the economic integration of Southeast Asia and its shrinking international space. At the same time, Ma utilized the improvement in cross-strait relations as a leverage for engaging in talks with Washington on intellectual property rights enforcement, import of US agricultural products and weapon sales to Taiwan.
Although Ma once again mentioned direct cross-strait weekend charter flights and allowing more Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, he said this would hinge on whether Taiwan and China could move into a new era. He also appealed to Beijing to consider the fact that both nations are largely composed of ethnic Chinese — a tactic that is both forceful and compliant.
With full knowledge that Beijing would not respond in the short term, Ma still offered reconciliation as the objective of his cross-strait effort, saying that Taiwan would become a harbinger of peace, thereby implying that former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) government was a harbinger of trouble — again combining force and compliancy.
The problem is, we cannot control how Beijing and the US will respond. Will Beijing maintain a passive position during long-term cross-strait negotiations? Can the Chinese authorities only give without asking for anything in return?
Ma has said that Taiwan’s relationship with the US as a trade partner and a security ally must be strengthened, that an adequate defense budget is needed and defensive weapons must be purchased. He has also said that a resumption of dialogue with Beijing should be built on the so-called “1992 consensus.” No doubt all these statements set Washington’s mind at ease.
However, it was the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) that opposed numerous weapon purchase bills during its term in opposition. The US has also refused to sell F-16C/D aircraft to Taiwan for political considerations, did not support the development of the Hsiung Feng IIE anti-ship missile and was in two minds over the sale of submarines.
The situation has changed. Will Ma and the administration of US President George W. Bush consider new measures once trust between Taiwan and the US has been restored?
If Taiwan, faced with China’s superior military power, does not develop or purchase the necessary defensive weapons, how can it strengthen its national defense and negotiate with Beijing from a position of confidence? The US and Taiwan still have different view of what constitutes essential defensive weapons, and these differences must be resolved.
In his inaugural speech, Ma said nothing about signing a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US. Coincidentally, US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte did not mention it either when testifying before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations earlier this month, showing that the two parties have not reached a consensus on this issue.
The problem is if the Bush administration is unwilling to set an example by negotiating an FTA with the Ma administration, how can Taipei expect Beijing to allow the ASEAN to negotiate such a deal with Taiwan?
As for Taiwan’s highly sensitive bid to gain observer status in the World Health Assembly (WHA) — the WHO’s top decision-making body — Negroponte did show his support. Still, without Beijing’s approval, Washington’s support is nothing but empty words. During the Democratic Progressive Party government’s rule, Beijing’s obstruction of Taipei’s bid created a lot of public discontent. If Ma fails to bring Taiwan into the WHA within the next few years, he will have a problem explaining his failure to Taiwanese voters.
Cold War thinking is causing Washington to worry that cross-strait unification may be unfavorable to US national and strategic interests. Post-Cold War thinking also implies that annexation is unlikely owing to tensions and confrontation between these two major powers. However, Taiwan’s economic and trade integration with China and the Southeast Asian region is inevitable. How will Taiwan, China and the US deal with this trend? This deserves more attention in future.
Edward Chen is a professor in the Graduate Institute of American Studies at Tamkang University.
TRANSLATED BY ANGELA HONG AND EDDY CHANG
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations