Thu, Jul 01, 2010 page8

• Reasons for ECFA are red herrings

  • By Nathan Novak 李漢聲
  • • 
    • 
    • 

  Long ago ‑— 2004 to be exact — professor Samuel Kim edited a book titled The International Relations of Northeast Asia. Chapter 10 of that book, written by Lynn T. White III, is titled “Taiwan’s External Relations: Identity versus Security.” There is a section of that chapter titled “Taiwan’s Security as Mainly Economic.” The section lasts from page 316 to page 318, and although it was written during the heightened cross-strait tensions of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) presidency, its message remains clear today: Taiwan’s security is mainly economic.

  This is important because six years ago, academics were already quite clear in their understanding that, as White writes, “Mines and missiles launched against Taiwan’s economy, rather than ships and airplanes against [Taiwan’s] territory, are the main armed threats to the island [to the extent that Taiwan’s economy is not already centered in China].”

  That’s an interesting assertion. Many mark Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) presidency as the beginning of cross-strait reconciliation. Few take into account that cross-strait economic ties have been both strong and growing since the 1980s.

  The economic detente since the 1980s is an interesting phenomenon as well. During both the Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chen presidencies — especially during Chen’s era — economic ties grew despite political bickering and rhetoric.

  Despite threats to Taiwan’s security and sovereignty, coercive acts such as launching missiles and carrying out provocative military exercises during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, which involved a US fleet, and the Tiananmen Square massacre, cross-strait economic ties have grown and strengthened.

  Also in Kim’s book is a chapter written by Thomas Moore and titled “China’s International Relations: The Economic Dimension.” On page 112, Moore writes: “[C]loser economic cooperation will enhance [Beijing’s] leverage vis-a-vis Taipei ... by making [Taiwan] more reliant upon the mainland for its economic well-being.” This is no secret, and has not been one since at least 2004, the time of the book’s publication. In fact, it has been a well-known fact for more than a decade.

  For more than 10 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been trying to, as White writes, “de-emphasiz[e], at least for now, the use of military force as a means to achieve reunification.” The implication is that it is a well-known fact that Beijing has been using economic means to “leverage” Taiwan into “reunification.”

  So why is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) so necessary? Is the ECFA necessary to create a positive environment wherein Taiwan can sign free-trade agreements (FTAs) with other economies and nations? In 2004, White knew, as did many other academics, that “Beijing has issued a series of stern warnings that other countries should not enter into FTAs with Taiwan.” In late May and early last month, this was once again made clear to the world as Beijing openly protested the possibility of Taiwan using the ECFA and stronger cross-strait ties to sign FTAs with other countries.

  How about the possibility that Taiwan will lose out in terms of regional economic competitiveness if it didn’t sign the ECFA, especially since the FTA between the PRC and ASEAN came into effect at the beginning of this year?

  This is a doubtful reason for the necessity of an ECFA. Why? Because if China were to allow Taiwan to be pushed, even slowly, out of the Chinese market, and if cross-strait trade and investment began to wane, China’s influence over Taiwan would also wane. Moreover, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) policies of flexibility and economic openness toward Taiwan would become a political burden for him during the final years of his tenure and before his successor takes over in 2012.

  In conclusion, these two issues, which Ma has trumpeted as the major reasons for signing the ECFA with China, are red herrings — Taiwan most likely will not gain extra economic recognition from other countries through bilateral FTAs, because the other parties involved will continue to bow to Chinese intimidation even after the ECFA comes into effect, and the PRC will certainly not let Taiwan fall from its gravitational pull, neither politically nor economically, ECFA or no ECFA.

  Nathan Novak studies China and the Asia-Pacific region at National Sun Yat-sen University.
• Most Popular

  • 1

    Philippine banana sauce stopped at border: FDA

  • 2

    Chinese landing ships vulnerable, military expert says

  • 3

    New base in Philippines positioned close to Taiwan

  • 4

    People who clashed with police to be investigated

  • 5

    Olympic medalist Lin pulled from world championships