Long ago ‑— 2004 to be exact — professor Samuel Kim edited a book titled The International Relations of Northeast Asia. Chapter 10 of that book, written by Lynn T. White III, is titled “Taiwan’s External Relations: Identity versus Security.” There is a section of that chapter titled “Taiwan’s Security as Mainly Economic.” The section lasts from page 316 to page 318, and although it was written during the heightened cross-strait tensions of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) presidency, its message remains clear today: Taiwan’s security is mainly economic.
This is important because six years ago, academics were already quite clear in their understanding that, as White writes, “Mines and missiles launched against Taiwan’s economy, rather than ships and airplanes against [Taiwan’s] territory, are the main armed threats to the island [to the extent that Taiwan’s economy is not already centered in China].”
That’s an interesting assertion. Many mark Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) presidency as the beginning of cross-strait reconciliation. Few take into account that cross-strait economic ties have been both strong and growing since the 1980s.
The economic detente since the 1980s is an interesting phenomenon as well. During both the Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chen presidencies — especially during Chen’s era — economic ties grew despite political bickering and rhetoric.
Despite threats to Taiwan’s security and sovereignty, coercive acts such as launching missiles and carrying out provocative military exercises during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996, which involved a US fleet, and the Tiananmen Square massacre, cross-strait economic ties have grown and strengthened.
Also in Kim’s book is a chapter written by Thomas Moore and titled “China’s International Relations: The Economic Dimension.” On page 112, Moore writes: “[C]loser economic cooperation will enhance [Beijing’s] leverage vis-a-vis Taipei ... by making [Taiwan] more reliant upon the mainland for its economic well-being.” This is no secret, and has not been one since at least 2004, the time of the book’s publication. In fact, it has been a well-known fact for more than a decade.
For more than 10 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been trying to, as White writes, “de-emphasiz[e], at least for now, the use of military force as a means to achieve reunification.” The implication is that it is a well-known fact that Beijing has been using economic means to “leverage” Taiwan into “reunification.”
So why is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) so necessary? Is the ECFA necessary to create a positive environment wherein Taiwan can sign free-trade agreements (FTAs) with other economies and nations? In 2004, White knew, as did many other academics, that “Beijing has issued a series of stern warnings that other countries should not enter into FTAs with Taiwan.” In late May and early last month, this was once again made clear to the world as Beijing openly protested the possibility of Taiwan using the ECFA and stronger cross-strait ties to sign FTAs with other countries.
How about the possibility that Taiwan will lose out in terms of regional economic competitiveness if it didn’t sign the ECFA, especially since the FTA between the PRC and ASEAN came into effect at the beginning of this year?
This is a doubtful reason for the necessity of an ECFA. Why? Because if China were to allow Taiwan to be pushed, even slowly, out of the Chinese market, and if cross-strait trade and investment began to wane, China’s influence over Taiwan would also wane. Moreover, Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) policies of flexibility and economic openness toward Taiwan would become a political burden for him during the final years of his tenure and before his successor takes over in 2012.
In conclusion, these two issues, which Ma has trumpeted as the major reasons for signing the ECFA with China, are red herrings — Taiwan most likely will not gain extra economic recognition from other countries through bilateral FTAs, because the other parties involved will continue to bow to Chinese intimidation even after the ECFA comes into effect, and the PRC will certainly not let Taiwan fall from its gravitational pull, neither politically nor economically, ECFA or no ECFA.
Nathan Novak studies China and the Asia-Pacific region at National Sun Yat-sen University.
The image was oddly quiet. No speeches, no flags, no dramatic announcements — just a Chinese cargo ship cutting through arctic ice and arriving in Britain in October. The Istanbul Bridge completed a journey that once existed only in theory, shaving weeks off traditional shipping routes. On paper, it was a story about efficiency. In strategic terms, it was about timing. Much like politics, arriving early matters. Especially when the route, the rules and the traffic are still undefined. For years, global politics has trained us to watch the loud moments: warships in the Taiwan Strait, sanctions announced at news conferences, leaders trading
Eighty-seven percent of Taiwan’s energy supply this year came from burning fossil fuels, with more than 47 percent of that from gas-fired power generation. The figures attracted international attention since they were in October published in a Reuters report, which highlighted the fragility and structural challenges of Taiwan’s energy sector, accumulated through long-standing policy choices. The nation’s overreliance on natural gas is proving unstable and inadequate. The rising use of natural gas does not project an image of a Taiwan committed to a green energy transition; rather, it seems that Taiwan is attempting to patch up structural gaps in lieu of
The Executive Yuan and the Presidential Office on Monday announced that they would not countersign or promulgate the amendments to the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures (財政收支劃分法) passed by the Legislative Yuan — a first in the nation’s history and the ultimate measure the central government could take to counter what it called an unconstitutional legislation. Since taking office last year, the legislature — dominated by the opposition alliance of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party — has passed or proposed a slew of legislation that has stirred controversy and debate, such as extending
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators have twice blocked President William Lai’s (賴清德) special defense budget bill in the Procedure Committee, preventing it from entering discussion or review. Meanwhile, KMT Legislator Chen Yu-jen (陳玉珍) proposed amendments that would enable lawmakers to use budgets for their assistants at their own discretion — with no requirement for receipts, staff registers, upper or lower headcount limits, or usage restrictions — prompting protest from legislative assistants. After the new legislature convened in February, the KMT joined forces with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and, leveraging their slim majority, introduced bills that undermine the Constitution, disrupt constitutional
RSS