President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said during a recent radio interview in Taichung that Taiwanese college and university students are not as competitive as they used to be.
This assertion is often made in the media, but when the accusation comes from the president, we need to look carefully and see whether it is based in truth.
A frequently cited example is the decline of Taiwanese students’ average Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) scores compared with students from other countries. Some take this as proof that Taiwanese students’ English proficiency is declining.
But is this the real cause of the lower scores?
Back in the days when the president and I were students, less than 20 percent of high school students moved on to college, and most of the best university students hoped to pursue advanced education abroad after graduation.
Most of those who took the TOEFL test in Taiwan, therefore, were students who performed well and who had relatively proficient English.
SHARP INCREASE
Over the past decade, however, the number of colleges and universities has sharply increased. At the same time, the number of top students who choose to study abroad has decreased as more of them choose to continue their education in Taiwan.
As a result, the English proficiency of those who take the TOEFL is now much closer to the proficiency of the average Taiwanese student.
Hence, it seems unfair to compare the average TOEFL score of past students, who were drawn from the top 20 percent of the high school population, with that of today’s broader-based student population and then claim that this demonstrates a decline in proficiency.
As society has evolved, ordinary families have placed more value on education. Universities are also evolving as schools pay greater attention to the quality of teaching.
In general, student proficiency has improved. The characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of different generations may vary, but in terms of academic training, the top students of this generation can be thought of as superior to those of previous generations. To compare the bulk of today’s students with their elite predecessors is not only unfair, but also misleading.
OPPORTUNITIES
These days people are under the impression that Taiwanese university students’ English proficiency is declining and that they can be admitted to college with extremely low scores. While there is some truth in this, it is a result of a marked increase in schooling opportunities, not a fall in the quality of higher education.
Providing more opportunities for students to go to college could be a good thing or a bad thing, and it is an issue that should be discussed. An increase in schooling opportunities, however, does not mean that schools do not take education seriously.
President Ma’s suggestion of improving students’ international understanding and overall competitiveness certainly has merit.
His suggestion that students and teachers work harder, however, is unfortunate, because even if it were to improve student proficiency by a slight degree, it would still fail to meaningfully address the problems in the education system.
Besides, such talk does nothing to stimulate the confidence and ambition of Taiwan’s next generation.
Chen Sinn-wen is dean of the Office of Student Affairs at National Tsing Hua University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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