When Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao (
As for the second claim, a more complex question follows: Given Beijing's willingness to use threatening language against Taiwan (officially) and Washington (unofficially, through media outlets and former officials or military figures), why are US-China relations not already being discussed in terms of a new cold war?
The "Cold War" reference is dubious and there are a number of reasons for this. Unlike the Soviet Union at the height of its power, China cannot begin to compete with the US militarily in global terms. But it does wish to compete in -- with a view to dominate -- the region. This is not necessarily interpreted by US politicians as hostile, especially given the mythology that has developed over Chinese history and its entitlement to "great power" status.
The second is that China and the US have an economic and financial relationship that is far more intertwined and sophisticated than the Soviet Union ever experienced with the US.
The third is that the Chinese do not exercise anywhere near the same influence in other countries as the Soviets did and therefore do not pose a corresponding geostrategic threat. Even autocratic countries in the region that have close economic ties with China can hardly be thought of as belonging to a Chinese bloc. And while Beijing is increasingly acting as an imperial power in its domestic governance and its client-patron relations with developing countries, this does not extend to China calling the shots with other governments. If anything, the Chinese prefer to keep a distance -- or at the least, be seen to be doing so.
The fourth is that the balance of popular opinion and political rhetoric in the US does not fully recognize the threat China poses to the US, economically or militarily.
The fifth is that the Chinese have lost all ideological credibility as communists or even socialists. Beijing poses no revolutionary threat to a capitalist superpower because it is adapting as quickly as possible to the parameters of capitalism. Its refusal to simultaneously introduce democratic reform is not in itself considered threatening to other powers, which is partly why interest in the human rights of Chinese at home waxes and wanes with the seasons.
The sixth is that the US and its allies are preoccupied with long-term and dispiriting combat missions in the Middle East. Compared with the "hot war" wastelands of Iraq and Afghanistan, the stalemates in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon and the aggressive language of Tehran and Damascus, the Chinese seem positively polite. With all the "hot wars" that Washington must conduct, a Chinese "Cold War" is hardly a priority.
Lastly, the Chinese have been milking the Korean Peninsula for all it is worth. A Cold War adversary can hardly be described as such when it is a supposed ally in the neutralization of a criminal regime equipped with nuclear technology.
None of this changes the fact that the Chinese, by virtue of their actions and habits, are close to spoiling for a "Cold War." It is simply a function of time, wisdom and inclination as to when the Americans appreciate that a China under Communist Party control cannot take any other route, despite the Orwellian blusterings of its spokesmen.
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