On Jan. 29, the Chinese-language Liberty Times (the sister newspaper of the Taipei Times) ran an editorial discussing the impact of China's recent launch of its new satellite-destroying weapon on the overall US and Japanese regional strategy. Besides those issues, China's decision is going to have major repercussions for the Taiwanese space program.
By successfully reproducing the anti-satellite technology developed by the US and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the Chinese military has caused Europe, the US and Japan to question the nature of its space development program.
It will also lead to international pressure resulting from the dangerous debris that will remain in orbit for at least two decades, which could damage other countries' satellites operating below an alrtitude of 860km. What the Chinese military actually wants to achieve is to counteract the strengthening US-Japan military alliance and fulfill its goal of annexing Taiwan by force.
Taiwan won international recognition by its successful deployment of the FORMOSAT-3 satellite last year. This satellite follows a low orbit at the same altitude as the one knocked down by China. China's threat to Taiwan's space assets is therefore abundantly clear.
Taiwan should actively pursue three projects to deal with the challenge from China's space program.
First, it should not rely on only one satellite to conduct its low-orbit remote reconnaissance. Since the National Space Organization (NSPO) already has a top-notch imaging planning and scheduling system, Taiwan needs only to form strategic partnerships with international imaging providers to ensure that its photographic reconnaissance needs are met.
If Taiwan can achieve this goal, the overall risk will be greatly reduced. More importantly, China would consequently pay a much higher price if it were to destroy Taiwan's capabilities to conduct remote reconnaissance in space.
Second, Taiwan should establish its own ability to develop remote reconnaissance satellites and the ability to send replacements into space if its current remote reconnaissance satellite is attacked or damaged.
To guarantee that satellites will be able to carry out their missions, it is important that operators on the ground be familiar with how to handle them during early orbit, the critical stage during which operators guide the satellite into orbit after it has detached from the launch vehicle.
A series of independently produced satellites could be the heritage of Taiwan's space program. They could also help ensure that operators have better control over their functions during early orbit operations as well as when updating them.
Third, researching and developing a launch vehicle could have strategic significance for the independence of Taiwan's space program. Having a launch vehicle is the basic prerequisite for major space powers to get practical experience in developing their own space technology. A launch vehicle would quickly accelerate Taiwan into an actual recognized presence in space and also enhance its independent satellite development.
Implementing this will require the formation of an agency to plan and execute it, but the more crucial factor will be having an adequate budget.
The planned budget for the NSPO was cut by one-fourth due to a boycott in the legislature. The delayed passage of the government's budget will have a substantial impact on research and development.
At such a critical stage, the legislature should give full support to investment in space and the space budget in order to safeguard Taiwan's space intelligence and protect national security.
Lance Wu is director general of the National Space Organization.
Translated by Daniel cheng and Marc Langer
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