The Coast Guard Administration aims to protect the rights of Taiwanese fishermen in the East China Sea.
To achieve this, a temporary enforcement line between Taiwanese and Japanese waters was established in July 2003.
Although some Taiwanese fishing boats have been apprehended within the enforcement line by the Japanese maritime police, the incidence of such cases is decreasing.
The line has thus proven effective.
Japanese and Taiwanese experts, however, still do not agree on how the line should be determined and what legal status it should have.
Japan is a country made up of islands. But because Article 47 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is not beneficial to its territorial sea claims, Japan has chosen in this case not to consider itself as an archipelagic state.
The first clause of Article 47 states: "An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1."
It is clear that the islands and reefs south of the island of Greater Ryukyu do not meet these proportional requirements and therefore do not justify drawing a baseline as desired.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not force archipelagic states to claim their rights as stated in the document.
However, allowing such states to define their territorial waters by drawing straight archipelagic baselines that do not follow Article 47 is against the convention's guiding spirit.
Archipelagic states that base their territorial claims on straight archipelagic baselines should be subjected to certain restrictions. This has been overlooked in the convention.
If Japan -- in addition to its 200 nautical mile (370.4km) exclusive economic zone and continental shelf rights -- is allowed to use straight archipelagic baselines, using the Miyako and the Yaeyama Islands -- including Ishigaki, Iriomote and the Yonaguni islands, which are closer to Taiwan than Japan -- Japan will clearly be infringing on Taiwan's territorial waters.
Japan's territorial water claims violate four articles in the UN convention.
Article 15 deals with delimitation of the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. Article 74 deals with the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. Article 83 deals with the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.
Japan is also violating Clause 6 of Article 7, which states: "The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone."
In other words, Japan cannot draw a straight archipelagic baseline between the Yaeyama and Miyako Islands since that would cut off Taiwan's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.
In June 1996, Japan announced straight line base points as well as baselines.
The southernmost base point, point 66, is located on the southern tip of Greater Ryukyu Island at 26 degrees 4 minutes and 30 seconds north and 127 degrees, 39 minutes and 25 seconds south.
Japan has not announced any base points or baselines on the Miyako and Yaeyama islands, but is probably considering doing so.
Japan cannot use these islands to back a claim for an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf rights.
There are a number of reasons for this.
The islands are located further than 185.2km away from the Greater Ryukyu Islands, and even further away from the island of Kyushu. The regulated length of a baseline is 185.2km. These islands are in fact located closer to Taiwan.
The surface area of the islands is also too small.
The area of the Yaeyama Islands is 591.8km2 and the area of the Miyako Islands is 225.86 km2. These islands do not entitle Japan to a 370.4km exclusive economic zone because if a middle line is drawn between the islands and Taiwan it infringes upon the equity principle.
Yonaguni Island in particular only has a surface area of 28.88km2.
In addition, the waters between the Yaeyama and Miyako islands and Greater Ryukyu Island fall within the scope of Taiwan's 370.4km exclusive economic zone.
An exclusive economic zone can therefore not be given based on the Yaeyama and Miyako island groups without disrupting the continuity of Taiwan's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.
The island groups should, however, be entitled to the 22.2km territorial waters.
In addition, the waters surrounding the Yaeyama, Miyako and Greater Ryukyu islands are the traditional fishing waters of Taiwanese fishermen.
Based on article 51 in the UN convention, which deals with existing agreements, traditional fishing rights and existing submarine cables, Japan should take into account the traditional fishing waters of Taiwanese fishermen.
The greater issue surrounding the temporary enforcement line is the northern line drawn from the Diaoyutai, or Senkaku, islands. If Japan doubts the legitimacy of this line, negotiations could be held to define a jointly managed fishing area.
Chen Hurng-yu is a professor at the Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Tamkang University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS