The farcical campaign to oust President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) continues even though the two slogans adopted by the red-clad protesters, "oppose corruption" and "beyond blue and green," are the most blatant of lies.
If the supporters of former Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) chairman Shih Ming-teh (施明德) are really opposed to corruption, then they should first vehemently protest against the most corrupt party of any democratic country, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT).
This party unashamedly clings to the vast stock of assets it seized during its dictatorial rule over Taiwan and still refuses to return them -- even a decade after Taiwan became a democratic country.
The New York Times reported recently that the KMT is the wealthiest political party in the world. Well, of course. Is there any other party in the democratic world that has the gall to break the law as brazenly as the KMT? If one wants to talk about opposing graft, is there any corruption more in need of opposition than the KMT's pool of stolen assets?
Since Shih and his supporters demand that Chen and the DPP be held to "the highest moral standards," why don't they apply the most basic moral standards to the KMT and Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九)? By using two different standards to measure sleaze, this "anti-corruption" movement has shown itself to be nothing more than a tool for other purposes.
This is similar to a person who condemns sexual harassment but is silent on rape. It only shows that the condemnations are a red herring.
Politicians have always used such deceptions. In calling for Taiwan to go "beyond blue and green," Shih is engaging in similar behavior.
Some facts are indisputable. The pan-blue camp rejects Taiwan's right to become a normal and independent country. The pan-green camp wants to lead Taiwan down the path toward a new constitution, a change in its official title and nationhood.
If the anti-Chen movement really isn't about mainstream blue-green politics, then it should tolerate people of either political persuasion. But why is it that people who support an independent Taiwan at the anti-Chen rallies are abused by the red-clad demonstrators, actions for which Shih has often apologized?
Why is it that when the sea of anti-Chen protesters yells "long live the Republic of China" and "long live the Three Principles of the People," Shih is all smiles? Aren't his followers supposed to be above political division?
It is true that this movement, which the Chinese-language United Daily News calls a "green head with a blue body," has former green-camp followers in it, but its ideology is centered completely around the blue camp's anti-independence philosophy.
Therefore Shih's anti-Chen campaign is not only entirely unrelated to opposing corruption, but is also devoid of any truly bipartisan philosophy. Its nothing but a cover for yet another episode in the series of anti-Chen and anti-green-camp efforts the KMT has engaged in since the party refused to accept the verdict of the 2004 presidential election.
In essence, therefore, it is still about blue versus green, the old power versus the reformers, unification versus independence. But this time, they've lined up three different armies for the attack.
The first wave is Shih's "red army," the second wave is the KMT and waiting behind both is the Chinese Communist Party. They've come together under the pretext of toppling Chen, but it's just another attack on the pan-green camp and a democratically elected and pro-localization regime.
Cao Changqing is a freelance journalist based in the US.
Translated by Marc Langer
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