On Monday, the TAIEX fell 244 points. It's not difficult to fathom that recent political instability has led to poor stock performance, but the decline in shares has also spawned conspiracy theories. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) believes the opposition parties' mobilization to recall the president and topple Premier Su Tseng-chang's (
Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) held cross-party talks on whether to hold an extraordinary legislative session to review some urgently needed bills. Legislators from ruling and opposition parties have agreed to the session, but are split over which bills should be given priority. DPP legislators hope to prioritize budget bills related to people's livelihoods and the economy, while opposition legislators want to prioritize legislation related to the presidential recall campaign and direct links. Given this deep political chasm, the session could simply provide another occasion for pointless political bickering.
The insider-trading case involving Chen's son-in-law Chao Chien-ming (趙建銘) has attracted huge political and media interest. Every development stirs more controversy. Whether Chao is implicated in the scandal or not, the case will have serious implications for the nation's political scene. Nevertheless, the seemingly endless coverage of it is surely abnormal.
The investigation into Chao's case is about to come to a close. The prosecutor will decide whether to present an indictment against Chao. But we cannot start discussing what legal and political responsibility Chen must bear until Chao is found guilty of the charges presented, or Chen and his family members are implicated. Prior to this, any attempt to force the resignation of the premier or recall the president is unwise and will likely plunge the nation into further turmoil.
While the People First Party (PFP) is planning to unseat Chen, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is taking aim at the Cabinet. Since recalling the president requires the approval of two-thirds of legislators, the KMT thinks it doesn't have the numbers. However, the pan-blues do possess enough legislative seats to force the resignation of the Cabinet. If Chen decided to dissolve the legislature in response, this would force an election, which under the Constitution, would be under the new "single-district, two-vote" system. That means half the legislators would be out of a job. While neither KMT nor PFP legislators desire this, the result would be worse for the PFP, which would likely dissolve completely, allowing the KMT to dislodge both of its political rivals in one go. But, unable to put its ideal plan into action, the KMT has settled on launching a petition to recall the president, so that it does not lose support to the PFP.
The scandals surrounding Chen's entourage and his family are extremely regrettable. It is imperative that law enforcement officials conduct a thorough investigation into all the allegations and find out who is responsible. The public should remain cool and not give politicians an opportunity to engage in further strife. While the recall proposal can be discussed at the special legislative session, issues involving people's livelihoods should top the agenda. Otherwise, contention over the recall is likely to overwhelm all other bills, rendering a special session pointless.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
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The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
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