Chinese President Hu Jintao (
Washington's long-term effort to build up a "candid, constructive and cooperative" relationship with Beijing constitutes a broader agenda in terms of engaging China in the international system. The aim is to incrementally transform China into a politically democratic and economically liberal country, while at the same time letting its leaders shoulder the responsibility of being a great power. The current Bush team has developed a strategy of "co-engagement" with China.
Despite uncertainties within Chinese society, there is a greater need for China to understand its own responsibility as an emerging power. China's future role not only affects the establishment of a new international order politically, it also relates to the formation of a peaceful and secure post-Cold War era in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the liberalization and internationalization of China's economy will have a decisive effect on the process of globalization.
International observers argue that the danger of conflict increases particularly when the challenger is an undemocratic state. Democracies are generally satisfied powers, unlikely to challenge the status quo. An undemocratic challenger, however, is more threatening to the world order, and hence more likely to induce a more belligerent response from a democratic leader and its allies.
Given that Beijing is already expanding its own political, military and economic influence, it is worth asking whether or not China understands all the responsibilities of being a "great power." More significantly, does China have the capability to shoulder this responsibility?
The biggest irony lies in China's unwillingness to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Hu has not indicated that he is ready to begin talks with Taiwan's elected leader -- President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Regarding Taiwan, the Chinese leadership has offered nothing new, instead demanding its unilateral acceptance of the "one China" principle as a condition for resuming cross-strait talks.
Beijing must understand that the status of a "great power" is not illustrated by active expansion of military capabilities or in military threats against smaller countries. As a great power, China must understand its responsibilities from the perspective of acting as a leader in the region. Suppressing Taiwan's international space and creating tension across the Taiwan Strait are not constructive in this regard. Unilaterally requesting that the Taiwanese accept ultimate "unification" with China also violates freedom of choice.
Therefore, instead of wildly guessing whether Bush will verbally condemn recent moves by Taiwan's leader to provoke Beijing when he meets Hu, the public and the local media should take into account the larger political picture of how China should bear responsibility internationally as a rising power. Moreover, discussion should also focus on how a democratic Taiwan can help shape China's belligerent and undemocratic mentality.
Only by distinguishing Taiwan's democracy and peace-loving free will from China's military-oriented authoritarian rule will the global community fully understand the need to breed a politically democratic and economically liberal China.
Liu Kuan-teh is Taipei-based political commentator.
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