In February, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) proclaimed his intention to seek the nation's return to the UN under the name "Taiwan," rather than "Republic of China." The proposal was branded as "provocative" and "destabilizing" by China, some foreign governments and international press outlets. As is so often the case in matters related to Taiwan, it is time for a reality check.
In the 1980s, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) began to promote a "pragmatic approach" to international relations in an effort to reverse Taiwan's drift toward complete diplomatic isolation. Lee eventually added Taiwan's return to the UN to the government's foreign policy agenda. Under ordinary circumstances, any given state might simply hold a national referendum on UN membership and then receive a warm welcome into the global body after the initiative proved successful.
For example, Swiss voters agreed to a proposal to join the UN in a referendum in 2002. Upon learning that 55 percent of the country's voters approved the measure, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan applauded the move and declared that "Switzerland is in many ways a vivid example of what the UN stands for -- a tolerant, peaceful and multicultural society built on democratic values." Why hasn't Taiwan received a similar reception?
Like Switzerland, Taiwan is a tolerant, peaceful, multicultural and democratic society. The US State Department describes Taiwan officially as a "multiparty democracy." Again, like Switzerland, Taiwan threatens no other states in the global community. With respect to international trade, the WTO now ranks Taiwan as the world's 15th largest importer and exporter, while Switzerland is the world's 18th largest importer and 21st largest exporter
Given such statistics, any objective observer might well wonder why Taiwan's quest to return to the UN receives little or no encouragement from the global institution or other states. To solve this riddle, one must look outside Taiwan.
Bowing to pressure from Bei-jing, the general committee of the UN's General Assembly has blocked all efforts by Taipei's diplomatic allies to place Taiwan's case on the assembly's agenda ever since the issue was first raised in 1993. In other words, the question of Taiwan's participation cannot even be discussed.
Moreover, it is highly probable that any nationwide referendum on the matter would be branded "provocative" and "destabilizing" by China and much of the international community. Unlike Switzerland, Taiwan might not be welcomed into the UN with open arms following a referendum on membership in the world body.
The UN case is important because it is illustrative of an inexorable fact. Namely, Taipei's foreign policy options are heavily constrained by Beijing. One need not look far to find other examples. Despite the 2003 SARS epidemic and the growing prospect of a global flu pandemic, Taiwan's participation in the WHO as a "non-state actor" with "observer" status has remained stalled ever since Taipei began to seek admission in 1997.
Moreover, not even one of the world's major countries is willing to maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan and only the US has the courage and fortitude to sell armaments to it on a regular basis, while also providing Taiwan with some sort of vague security guarantee. In short, despite Taiwan's remarkable economic and political achievements, China's actions, along with a propensity for the international community to acquiesce to Beijing's demands, has turned Taiwan into a diplomatic orphan.
By any acceptable definition of the term, the ROC on Taiwan is a sovereign state. It exercises predominant authority within its borders, possesses a relatively stable population that holds elections and owes allegiance to the Taipei government, and maintains formal diplomatic relations with more than two dozen other countries and close unofficial relations with many others.
Moreover, the Beijing regime has never exercised any control over Taiwan, has never written its laws or funded its government and is not accepted by the Taiwanese people as having any authority whatsoever within its borders. Yet China is permitted to block Taiwan's membership in most global institutions.
Beijing obstructs Taiwan's membership in international forums when it seeks to join using an official moniker that underscores the island's historic ties to China. And Beijing even opposes Taiwan's membership when it tries to join an institution in a humiliating capacity as a "non-state actor" with "observer status."
Therefore, China has only itself to blame if the Taiwanese government seeks to participate in the global community under the name "Taiwan." By isolating Taiwan one could make a strong case that it is Beijing which actually is engaging in "destabilizing" behavior. Beijing should follow the advice of some of its academics and businesspeople and look at the cross-strait relationship in a more realistic way. Blocking Taiwan's participation in the international community makes no sense.
Dennis Hickey is a professor of political science at Missouri State University.
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