A proposal was raised in the legislature on Friday to abolish the Republican (minguo
But nothing escapes the curse of the "Greater China" ideology.
Indeed, one would have been surprised if die-hard pan-blue-camp supporters did not jump up and slam the proposal as evidence of pro-independence sentiment and splittism.
This nation uses a dual-calendar system (not counting the still very relevant lunar calendar), and under the Republican calendar, 2006 is designated as the 95th year of the founding of the Republic of China (ROC).
Therefore, to some, abolishing this calendar is an attack on the very legitimacy, the very dignity, of the ROC, which in turn suggests that Taiwan is not part of China.
Use of the Gregorian calendar would therefore violate the "one China" principle, upsetting Beijing and Washington, despite the fact that China and the US use the Gregorian calendar.
One readily arrives at this prediction by looking at the response to the proposal to abolish the National Unification Council and the unification guidelines, or the proposal to abolish or at least curtail the teaching of classical Chinese in high school.
The council and the guidelines embody tokenism in every way. Very few people can remember when the council last convened (it was in 1999).
And everyone knows that with Taiwan's democratization, unification with China will require the consent of the electorate rather than the imprimatur of the council and its guidelines.
The legislature can hardly be credited with taking the council seriously, allotting the dormant agency an impressive NT$1,000 (US$31) budget.
Still, the proposal has attracted consternation from the US State Department, as well as the standard petulant threats of presidential impeachment from die-hards in the pan-blue camp.
Perhaps the State Department would also care to weigh in on the relevance of classical Chinese to a modernized Taiwan?
After all, much of modern vernacular Chinese is based on the classical form, it's culturally tagged to a pristine past, and -- most importantly -- it clumsily but effectively lends itself to a unificationist take on the status quo.
The beauty of literary Chinese is that it, like Latin, knew when to die.
What a pity the same truth is not self-evident for those who would treasure a government body that is riddled with rigor mortis.
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that Premier Su Tseng-chang (
But what is most disappointing is that he did not make a firm commitment to the proposal on the spot. Surely he knows that pan-blue lawmakers will have a field day over this.
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
RSS