"Little Japan" has become a buzzword in China in recent years, as growing nationalism rekindles old rivalries with its East Asian neighbor. Emboldened by the new economic and military power of "big China," the nationalists look down on the country whose troops briefly but brutally controlled most of lowland China before the end of World War II.
Just how big China will get is a concern for many nations, especially its neighbors.
On diplomatic visits, Chinese leaders discuss their country's "peaceful rise." They play down the nation's economic strength and regularly promise to increase imports from Southeast Asian countries, trying to sell a "win-win" picture of China's rapid inroads into global trade.
China's ruling Communist Party also points to tens of millions of Chinese people who still live in poverty, and highlights the US as the world's only superpower.
"Actually, it is now the US that plays a dominant role in this (Asia-Pacific) region," said Zhang Xiaoming (張小明), an international relations professor at Beijing University.
"The issue of China's threat is not so serious in the surrounding countries," Zhang said.
But many people in Japan and other Asian nations remain worried by China's economic and military might. Indonesia, for example, has an "undercurrent of uneasiness" about China, said Salim Said, an Indonesian independent political analyst,
Despite US President George W. Bush's unpopularity in the country, "Indonesians basically prefer good relations with America versus China," Salim said. "They're always suspicious that China has an idea of becoming lord of this part of the world... That kind of feeling is always below the surface."
At the APEC leaders' summit in Busan this week, China's growing diplomatic standing is likely to be more prominent than its economic and military rise.
President Hu Jintao (
"He will make proposals about prevention and control of infectious diseases and introduce China's future economic development plan," Li said.
Like Hu, Bush has also pledged to take the initiative in Busan on measures to fight avian influenza. Hu's raising of the issue "shows China is active in handling non-traditional security issues in a multilateral way," Zhang said.
China's diplomacy has been bolstered by keeping the momentum in protracted talks over North Korea's nuclear program, balancing the tough demands of North Korea and the US, and persuading the other five parties to agree to a joint statement of principles.
"It shows that China is a responsible country, and China is much more active in its diplomacy than in the past," Zhang said.
"The six-party talks are a typical example. In the past, China was reluctant to be a host country for this kind of multilateral meeting, it only participated passively," Zhang added.
Many diplomats in neighboring countries feel they must actively court a China that can only become more powerful in the future.
"The whole world is engaging with China in a more aggressive manner, as we are doing right now -- politically and militarily," said a senior Philippine diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Amid this growing diplomatic profile, Hu will make a state visit to South Korea the day before the leaders' summit. It is not clear if he will meet Bush in Busan. Any such meeting is likely to be brief, and mainly for show, since Bush will meet Hu in Beijing during a high-profile visit to China immediately after the APEC summit.
Another notable feature of the APEC summit is likely to be China's lack of diplomatic activity with Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stoked the ire of China and South Korea with another visit to the controversial Yasukuni war shrine last month.
Koizumi later said he hoped the issue of the shrine visits could be solved through dialogue with China, and that he hoped to meet Hu at the APEC summit. But Chinese analysts believe Hu will again snub Koizumi.
"In East Asia, Japan (not China) is the subject of much concern," said Gong Zhankai (
Gong said a meeting between Hu and Koizumi in Busan was "almost impossible."
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